KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
AND OTHER DOCUMENTS

Writing a Letter to the Chinese People's Volunteers

Supplement to "People's China"
August 1, 1953
The First Step Towards a Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Question

EDITOR’S NOTE

The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed at Panmunjom at 10 a.m. Korean time on July 27, 1953 by General Nam Il, Senior Delegate of the Delegation of the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers, and Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, Senior Delegate of the United Nations Command. Altogether 18 copies of the agreement in the Korean, Chinese and English languages were signed and later on they were forwarded separately for signature to Marshal Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army, and General Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, and General Mark Clark, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command. Twelve hours after the signing of the Armistice Agreement the ceasefire was put into effect along the whole Korean front. Thus, thanks to the unswerving persistence of the Korean and Chinese people and the tremendous efforts of peace-lovers all over the world, complete agreement was reached in the two-year-and-two-week-old Korean armistice negotiations and an end was brought to the fighting which has continued for three years and thirty-three days.

In this supplement, we print the editorial of the Peking “People’s Daily” published on July 28, 1953 on the signing of the Armistice in Korea, under the title of “The First Step Towards a Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Question,” and the Korean Armistice Agreement and other documents.
The First Step Towards a Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Question

Editorial of the Peking “People's Daily.”
July 28, 1953

The two-year-and-two-week-old Korean truce talks, thanks to the unflagging persistence of the Korean and Chinese people and their armed forces and the tremendous efforts of the peace-loving people throughout the world, have been brought to complete agreement after many twists and turns.

The Korean Armistice Agreement to which the whole world has been eagerly looking forward was signed on July 27, 1953 at Panmunjom. As Marshal Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-huai declared in their armistice orders:

The signing of the Armistice Agreement is the first step towards the settlement by peaceful means of the Korean question and is therefore beneficial to the peace of the Far East and to the progress of the Korean and Chinese peoples and has made all the peace-loving people of the world elated with joy.

The victory won by the Korean and Chinese people in their great and just war against aggression and in their fight for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question has proved in their resolve strong and in their courage to resist aggression and in their ability to fight off aggression and to defend peace. It has proved that the world is inviolable and that the forces of peace and democracy are infinitely powerful.

Three years ago, the reactionary Syngman Rhee clique, working in collusion with the United States, launched the Korean war which seriously endangered the peace and security of the Far East and the world. It was a futile attempt by international adventurers to annex the whole of Korea, to go one step further in aggression against China and to provoke a new world war. Even if they could not achieve this, they thought at least to maintain world tension and to amass great fortunes and postpone the outbreak of economic crisis by utilising war and the plans of war preparations. But in deciding on these adventurist activities, they overestimated their own strength and underestimated the strength of the people of Asia and the world. They could not bear to see the profound changes that took place in Asia after the Second World War and especially after the victory of the Chinese revolution. But like all those who refuse to recognize facts, they ran their heads against a wall. The heroic Korean and Chinese people dealt the aggressors smashing blows and held in check the most frantic aggressive actions carried out on the largest possible scale since the Second World War, and in which the imperialist camp exhausted every effort. Thus the international adventurers have found themselves in a state of utter confusion, desperation and danger. Their timetable for unleashing a new world war was not accomplished but delayed. It became increasingly clear to the comparatist camps that the conditions for securing a peaceful settlement of the Korean question on a fair and reasonable basis. Thus, the Korean and Chinese people, throughout the intricate course of the negotiations in the last two years, have striven for an agreement on the armistice negotiations with extreme firmness and patience.

As a result of the tremendous efforts made recently by Korea and China in solving the question of P.O.W. repatriation, which was the sole obstacle to the Armistice Agreement, and in halting the sabotage of the Syngman Rhee clique, the Korean armistice has at last been achieved. This is clear to everybody. At the same time, as V. M. Molotov and Foreign Minister Molotov of the U.S.S.R. pointed out in his statement of April 1 on the Korean question: "The Soviet Government has invariably supported all the steps towards reaching a just armistice and ending the war in Korea." The support of the U.S.S.R. and the people of other countries of the world for the policy of the Korean and Chinese people in insisting on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question has played a significant part in the achievement of the Korean armistice.

The course of the Korean War and the armistice negotiations shows clearly that, if only the people of the world firmly uphold the cause of peace, the spirit of negotiation will triumph over force. In the Korean War, although the United States mobilised the greater part of its ground, sea and air forces and the armed forces of 17 countries, and suffered a loss of over a million casualties and 25,000 million dollars, it has failed to win the war. On the other hand, the more the Korean and the Chinese people's forces fought, the stronger they became, and they have continuously won brilliant victories. In the recent counterattacks, the people's forces broke through the positions of four enemy divisions and put out of action some 40,000 enemy troops.

The war has shown that international problems cannot be settled by force. On the contrary, it was the adherence to the spirit of negotiation that caused the Korean armistice negotiations, which so many times reached difficult and seemingly insoluble situations, to finally find a compromise which proved acceptable to both sides. It follows that it will also not be impossible to peacefully settle other international disputes and longstanding problems. Naturally, this possibility depends both on mutual consultation and dealing with one another in the spirit of equality, and on the active struggle for peace of the people of the world.

Although the Korean Armistice Agreement has already been signed, the scrupulous observance and execution of all its provisions will definitely not be without their obstacles. People will all over the world still have to keep a most
vigilant eye at all times on some of the warlike elements of the American side, especially Syngman Rhee, the Syngman Rhee, who is intensifying his clamour against the armistice. This “hero” kept in an American gold fish bowl—for whose evil ambition the youth of more than a dozen nations have already shed rivers of blood without knowing why, just because certain people in Washington need him—as threatening to follow a “go it alone” policy and to wreck the armistice. He knows the two-faced nature of United States policy, and has, therefore, boldly taken upon himself, stringing up obstacles on the road to the armistice and attempting thereby to stop the wheel of peace in Korea. Thus the present problem depends entirely on whether the United States will continue its connivance with the Syngman Rhee gang or is prepared to change its attitude. General Nam II, senior delegate of our side, pointed out in his statement on July 19:

“If such a policy of connivance of the United Nations Command towards the South Korean government and forces continues, it is possible that the implementation of the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement will continue to be obstructed and, if so, the Armistice will become meaningless. But the governments and people of the nations through the world, particularly the governments and people of the nations concerned on both sides in the Korean conflict, we consider that if the United Nations Command side, in conformity with the findings of the inspection of the Military Armistice Commission and in connection with the demand of the peace-loving people throughout the world, strictly upholds all the solemn assurances already furnished by itself.

It is worth noting that a number of influential personalities in America have been openly supporting the sabotage activities of Syngman Rhee. Even as late as July 22, United States Secretary of State Dulles issued a statement encouraging Syngman Rhee’s armistice, saying that he is “entitled to do so.” In this statement, Dulles admitted that Syngman Rhee “had reserved his government’s position.”

Syngman Rhee’s so-called position, as instantly been proclaiming, namely, that he will not obstruct an armistice only for 90 days, and if the U.S. fail to serve its purpose of “uniting Korea” in 90 days, he will resume hostilities.” That Dulles can say Syngman Rhee is “entitled to do so,” is an open encouragement to Syngman Rhee to “resume hostilities.” However, it is universally known that the American Military Armistice Delegation is under Article 13 that “there is no time limit on the effectiveness of the Armistice Agreement.”

What we want to ask is whether the guarantee of the American negotiations delegate or the statement of Dulles is to count?

Three years ago, Dulles personally planned the unleashing of the war in Korea for Syngman Rhee with the result that Korea was drowned in a sea of blood. Now, he has again given open encouragement to Syngman Rhee to obstruct the carrying out of the armistice terms. As a party to the Korean armistice, the U.S. Government has the full responsibility of clarifying Dulles’ statement and stopping him from making any more absurd pronouncements.

The attitude of the Korean and Chinese side towards the Korean armistice is clear and resolute. It will firmly abide by and implement all the terms in the Armistice Agreement. As stipulated in the armistice orders which Marshal Kim II Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army, and General Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, issued to the units of this side:

All personnel of the ground, air and naval forces and the coast guard units of the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers should remain highly vigilant, firmly hold their positions and guard against any aggressive and disruptive actions from the other side.” This fully demonstrates this side’s serious attitude towards safeguarding the full implementation of the Armistice Agreement. If the Syngman Rhee clique and the South Korean Army dare to take action to wreck the fulfillment of the Armistice Agreement as they have announced, then the Korean-Chinese people’s forces are sure to take counter-action against aggression and in self-defence in accordance with the Armistice Agreement and the assurances provided by the American side on July 27 and 13, so as to safeguard the effective implementation of the armistice. The Korean and the Chinese people by no means wish to see such developments. They call upon the whole world to seriously supervise the American side so that it strictly control the Syngman Rhee clique, over which the American side has complete authority and which it is capable of controlling.

Of course, to attain the further peaceful settlement of the whole Korean question, there must be consultation in the political conference of a higher level. In connection with this, the Korean-Chinese side has consistently advocated that all foreign troops, including the Chinese People’s Volunteers, withdraw from Korea, and that the Korean question be settled by peaceful means, in the spirit of letting the Korean question be solved by the Korean people themselves, so as to facilitate the establishment of a united, democratic, peaceful and independent New Korea. This is the solemn mission of the political conference of a higher level. This political conference of a higher level is to be held within three months after the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, as recommended to the governments concerned by the commanders of both sides in the Korean war. The holding of this conference must be on the basis of equality in consultation. It is only thus that good results can be achieved. The Korean and the Chinese people and all peace-loving people throughout the world fervently hope that the calling of the political conference can proceed smoothly and that it will solve questions. We will struggle to the end for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. If any warlike elements dare to take advantage of the political conference to sabotage the armistice and wreck the conference, they are sure to meet with the strongest opposition from the Korean and the Chinese people and all peace-loving people the world over and will suffer even greater defeats.
COMMUNIQUE ON THE SIGNING OF THE
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

The Korean and Chinese delegation to the Korean armistice negotiations issued the following communique on July 27, 1953:

The Korean Armistice Agreement and the Temporary Agreement Supplementary to the Armistice Agreement were formally signed at Panmunjom, Korea, at 9 A.M., July 27, Korean time, by General Nam II, senior delegate of the Korean and Chinese side, and Lieutenant-General William K. Harrison, senior delegate of the other side. Copies of the agreement in their respective languages are being forwarded separately for signature to Marshal Kim II Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and General Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and General Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command.

In accordance with the agreement between both sides, all the armed forces under the control of both sides, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval and air forces, will cease completely all acts of hostility 12 hours after the signing of the agreement by the senior delegates of both sides, i.e., from 10 P.M., July 27, Korean time. All other provisions of the Armistice Agreement and its annex, as well as the Temporary Agreement Supplementary to the Armistice Agreement will, without exception, come into effect simultaneously with the cease-fire.

It is expressly provided in the Armistice Agreement that the commanders of the opposing sides must take all the necessary steps and measures among the military forces under their respective commands to ensure that personnel of their respective commands thoroughly abide by all the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. The articles and paragraphs of the Armistice Agreement will remain in effect until expressly superseded by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

Through the joint efforts and unflagging support of the peace-loving people throughout the world, the Korean and Chinese delegation to the Korean armistice negotiations have successfully fulfilled its task.

THE ARMISTICE ORDERS

Armistice Orders From Marshal Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-huai to Their Units

July 27, 1953

Comrades of the Korean People's Army and Comrades of the Chinese People's Volunteers:

The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers, after fighting heroically for three years against aggression and in defense of peace and after persevering for two years in the armistice negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, have won a glorious victory of an armistice in Korea and signed a Korean Armistice Agreement with the United Nations Command.

The signing of the Armistice Agreement is the first step towards the settlement by peaceful means of the Korean question and is therefore beneficial to the peace of the East and of the world. It has received the fervent support of the Korean and Chinese peoples and has made all the peace-loving people of the world elated with joy. But on the side of the United Nations Command there are still some bellicose elements, particularly the Syngman Rhee clique, who are greatly displeased with the realisation of an armistice in Korea, and are therefore strongly opposed to the signing of the Armistice Agreement. Hence all comrades of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers must heighten their vigilance.

On the occasion when the Armistice Agreement begins to become effective, we proclaim the following Orders in order to ensure firmly the realisation of the Korean armistice and against any disruption and to facilitate the convening of the Political Conference in furtherance of the peaceful settlement of the Korean question:

1. All personnel of the ground, air and naval forces and the coast guard units of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers should, in resolute observance of the Armistice Agreement, completely cease fire along the entire front from 22:00 hours, July 27, 1953, that is, 12 hours after the signing of the Armistice Agreement, and within 72 hours after 22:00 hours, July 27, 1953, that is, within 72 hours after the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw two kilometres along the entire front from the Demilitarized Zone.

2. All personnel of the ground, air and naval forces and the coast guard units of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers should remain highly vigilant, firmly hold their positions and guard against any aggressive and disruptive actions from the other side.

3. All personnel of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers should bid welcome to, protect the safety of, and give enthusiastic assistance to the work of the personnel of the Military Armistice Commission and its Joint Observer Teams, the personnel of the Neutral Nations' Commissions and the personnel of the Joint Red Cross teams, who may enter the areas under the control of our forces to carry out the Armistice Agreement.

KIM IL SUNG,
Marshal, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Supreme Commander, Korean People's Army

PENG TEH-HUI,
Commander, Chinese People's Volunteers
THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

Agreement Between the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the One Hand, and the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the Other Hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea

PREAMBLE

The undersigned, the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the one hand, and the Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound by and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following Articles and Paragraphs, by which said conditions and terms are intended to be merely advisory in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea.

ARTICLE I

MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARISATION ZONE

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometres from this line so as to establish a Demilitarised Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarised Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the attached map. (Map 1).

3. The Demilitarised Zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary, as indicated on the attached map. (Map 2).

4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Military Armistice Commission. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary line and their respective representatives in The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarised Zone.

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map. (Map 2). Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side.

6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarised Zone.

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorised to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

8. Any military or civilian, in the Demilitarised Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorised to do so by the Commander-in-Chief of whose territory entry is sought.

9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarised Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorised to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.

10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarised Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarised Zone which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarised Zone under the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders. In no case shall the total number authorised by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorised to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to preclude freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarised Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams and their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

ARTICLE II

CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEASE-FIRE AND ARMISTICE

A. GENERAL

12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this agreement is signed. (Paragraph 6 hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement).

13. In order to insure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall:

a. Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and coastal islands and waters of Korea of twenty-five (25) nautical miles以内 and the coastal islands and waters of Korea within thirty (30) nautical miles from the Barbed Line provided for herein. All demilitarisation, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the Demilitarised Zone after the withdrawal of military forces, shall be cleared up. If it is known to be free of all such hazards, shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission by the Commander-in-Chief of the zone to enter the Demilitarised Zone and to arrange for the replacement of such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe areas shall be cleared, and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarised Zone as directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, the armistice line shall be extended for a forty-five (45) day period, to complete salvage operations under Military Armistice Commission supervision. Such salvage forces shall not be withdrawn from the area and shall be extended as necessary as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice Commission and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides. Personnel authorised under Paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarised Zone.

b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and coastal islands and waters of Korea of twenty-five (25) nautical miles within the cease-fire line hereinafter established, its assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. All military forces, supplies, and equipment hereinafter shall be under the control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, except as otherwise defined in the Armistice Agreement.

c. Cease the introduction into Korea of all military personnel, provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on leave and in temporary duty, the rotation of units and personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope prescribed below. "Rotation period" shall mean the replacement of units or personnel by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea. Rotation periods for units and personnel to or from Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 48 hereof. Provided also, that no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service shall be on any one area. The movement of personnel to or from Korea shall be under the control of the Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command or its representatives. The movement of personnel to or from Korea shall be within the scope prescribed below.
I. COMPOSITION

16. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.

20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be made up of five members, five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commandant of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. Of the ten members, three from each side shall be of general or flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.

21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be entitled to use staff assistants as required.

22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing recorded secretarial, interpreting, and other such functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in Korean, English, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.

23. A Military Armistice Commission shall be initially established with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, and such number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.
The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one Joint Observer Team shall be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

2. GENERAL

The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to send Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one Joint Observer Team shall be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

C. NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISING COMMISSION

1. COMPOSITION

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN and SWITZERLAND. The term "neutral nations" as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be removed from the armed forces of the appointing nations.

Each neutral nation shall be entitled to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be entitled to perform the duties of the principal member.

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number of members present by one side is equal to the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by the other side.

Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be appointed to selected neutral nations and shall be furnished with the neutral nations as required. These staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.

The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with the following duties: recording and preserving secretarial, interpretive, and such other functions as may be required.

The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with the following duties: recording and preserving secretarial, interpretive, and such other functions as may be required.

2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY

The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to ensure that the provisions of this Armistice Agreement are fulfilled.

c. Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and investigation of the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and in the territorial waters under the control or jurisdiction of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and in the territorial waters under the control or jurisdiction of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

c. Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and investigation of the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and in the territorial waters under the control or jurisdiction of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and in the territorial waters under the control or jurisdiction of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be established at the following ports of entry:

- Territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers:
  - SINDU (39°46'N, 128°36'N)
  - CHONGJIN (39°45'N, 129°03'N)
  - HANGCHUN (39°23'N, 127°57'N)
  - MARPO (39°26'N, 125°26'N)
  - SINDU (39°46'N, 128°36'N)
  - CHONGJIN (39°45'N, 129°03'N)
  - HANGCHUN (39°23'N, 127°57'N)
  - MARPO (39°26'N, 125°26'N)

- Territory under the military control of the Chinese People's Volunteers:
  - HANGCHUN (39°23'N, 127°57'N)
  - MARPO (39°26'N, 125°26'N)

These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be established at the following ports of entry:

- Territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers:
  - SINDU (39°46'N, 128°36'N)
  - CHONGJIN (39°45'N, 129°03'N)
  - HANGCHUN (39°23'N, 127°57'N)
  - MARPO (39°26'N, 125°26'N)

- Territory under the military control of the Chinese People's Volunteers:
  - HANGCHUN (39°23'N, 127°57'N)
  - MARPO (39°26'N, 125°26'N)
Article III

ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions of this Article.

52. a. Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, each of the parties hereto shall establish a National Red Cross Society or a representative body of like character, in order to proceed with the work of repatriating the prisoners of war on its side of the Armistice Line. Each of said societies or representative bodies shall be designated as the "National Red Cross Society" or "Representative Body" for the purpose of this Article. The work of repatriation shall be conducted in accordance with the regulations that may be established by the three Societies for that purpose. The three Societies shall meet in conference in order to settle any points on which they may differ.

53. b. The release and repatriation of prisoners of war shall be accomplished only in accordance with the regulations established by the three Societies, and such regulations shall be subject to approval by the three Societies. The Three Societies shall have the power to designate one of their members as the "Chairman of the Joint Three National Red Cross Societies" to perform such duties as it deems necessary in furtherance of their joint efforts to secure the release and repatriation of prisoners of war. The Chairman of the Joint Three National Red Cross Societies shall have the power to designate one of his members to act as his representative in case of his absence from the three Societies.

54. The repatriation of all of the prisoners of war required by Sub-paragraph 52 above shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side shall make every effort to repatriate all of the prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practicable time.

55. c. If the release and repatriation of prisoners of war cannot be accomplished within the time limit specified in Sub-paragraph 52 above, the three Societies shall meet in conference for the purpose of determining the cause of the delay and the steps to be taken to effectuate the release and repatriation of prisoners of war as speedily as possible.

56. d. The National Red Cross Societies shall have the power to designate one of their members as the "Chairman of the Joint Three National Red Cross Societies" to perform such duties as it deems necessary in furtherance of their joint efforts to secure the release and repatriation of prisoners of war. The Chairman of the Joint Three National Red Cross Societies shall have the power to designate one of his members to act as his representative in case of his absence from the three Societies.

57. a. Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, Joint Red Cross teams shall be formed of representatives of the Red Cross Societies of the three countries, and such representatives shall conduct an inspection of the prisoners of war on the respective sides of the Armistice Line, and shall report their findings to the three Societies. The three Societies shall have the power to designate one of their members as the "Chairman of the Joint Three National Red Cross Societies" to perform such duties as it deems necessary in furtherance of their joint efforts to secure the release and repatriation of prisoners of war. The Chairman of the Joint Three National Red Cross Societies shall have the power to designate one of his members to act as his representative in case of his absence from the three Societies.

58. b. The Joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as follows:

(1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten (10) representatives from the National Red Cross Societies of each side, to conduct the inspection and receipt of prisoners of war on both sides, and to give notice to the appropriate Societies of delivery and receipt of prisoners of war. The work of these teams shall be conducted in conference with the three Societies of the two sides. The work and services of this team shall be under the direction of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

(2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the National Red Cross Societies of each side, to conduct the inspection and receipt of prisoners of war, and to give notice to the appropriate Societies of delivery and receipt of prisoners of war. The work of these teams shall be conducted in conference with the three Societies of the two sides. The work and services of this team shall be under the direction of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

59. c. The Joint Red Cross teams shall conduct their work in accordance with the regulations established by the three Societies, and such regulations shall be subject to approval by the three Societies. The three Societies shall have the power to designate one of their members as the "Chairman of the Joint Three National Red Cross Societies" to perform such duties as it deems necessary in furtherance of their joint efforts to secure the release and repatriation of prisoners of war. The Chairman of the Joint Three National Red Cross Societies shall have the power to designate one of his members to act as his representative in case of his absence from the three Societies.

60. d. The Joint Red Cross teams shall have the power to designate one of their members as the "Chairman of the Joint Three National Red Cross Societies" to perform such duties as it deems necessary in furtherance of their joint efforts to secure the release and repatriation of prisoners of war. The Chairman of the Joint Three National Red Cross Societies shall have the power to designate one of his members to act as his representative in case of his absence from the three Societies.
contributing forces to the United Nations Command shall serve as chairman of this team.

(4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross team, the team shall consist of not less than two (2) members from the team, with an equal number of representatives from each side, may be formed by mutual agreement.

(5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters, and such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to perform their mission, shall be furnished by the Commanding General of each side to the team operating in the territory under his military control.

e. The Commander of each side shall cooperate fully with the joint Red Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertake to ensure the security of the personnel of the joint Red Cross team in the area under his military control. The Commander of each side shall provide such logistic, administrative, and communications facilities as may be required by the team operating in the territory under his military control.

The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon completion of their mission or upon resistance of the provisions of this Subparagraph 5a hereof, which shall cease upon resistance.

5a. The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of the other side as soon as practicable, but that not later than ten (10) days after the Agreement becomes effective, the following information concerning prisoners of war:

(a) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped since the effective date of the armistice.

(b) Insofar as practicable, information pertaining to the sex, nationality, rank, identification, place of birth, date of death, and place of burial; or in the case of prisoners of war who died while in captivity.

b. If any prisoners of war escape or die in captivity, the Commander of the detaining side shall report the fact immediately to the Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners of War, data the Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners of War, shall be furnished by the Commanding General of each side to the team operating in the territory under the military control of the Commander of the other side.

c. Measures to effect the return of prisoners of war are described in paragraph 5b hereof.

Any escaped prisoner of war who returns after the effective date of the Agreement shall be considered as having escaped from captivity and the procedure for their return shall be in accordance with the provisions of Subparagraph 5a hereof. Such data shall be furnished by the Commanding General of the party to the exchange of delivery and reception of prisoners of war shall be determined by the Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners of War.

Arm and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and appointment of both sides, shall be made as soon as possible after this Agreement becomes effective.

2a. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall be responsible for the following:

(a) The return of displaced civilians to their homes or to places of residence.

(b) The relief of displaced civilians who are not able to return to their homes or to places of residence.

(c) The provision of assistance to displaced civilians who are unable to return to their homes or to places of residence.

ARTICLE V

MISCELLANEOUS

61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement shall be mutually agreed to by the Commanding General of the opposing sides.

62. The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until mutually superseded by mutually acceptable amendments and/or provision in an agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other than Paragraph 12, shall become effective at 2400 hours on July 27, 1953.
ANNEX

TERMS OF REFERENCE
FOR NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION COMMISSION

(See Sub-paragraph 51 b)

I

GENERAL

1. In order to ensure that all prisoners of war have the opportunity to exercise their right to be repatriated following an Armistice, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and India shall each request by both sides a member appointed to serve on a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which shall be established to take custody in Korea of all prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining powers, have not exercised their right to be repatriated. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall establish its headquarters in the vicinity of Panmunjom, and shall station subordinate bodies of the same Commission at such locations at which the Repatriation Commission assumes custody. Representatives of both sides shall be permitted to observe the operations of the Repatriation Commission and its subordinate bodies to include both general and special interviews.

2. Suffice armed forces and any other operating personnel required to assist the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in carrying out its functions shall be provided exclusively by the troops on India, whose representatives shall be provided exclusively by the troops of the United Nations and the representatives of each of the other equal number not to exceed fifty (50) each. When absent from the army due to sickness, that representative, if the representative of the neutral nations is designated an alternate representative shall be provided for in the same arm.

3. No force or threat of force shall be used against the prisoners of war specified in Paragraph 1 above to prevent or effect their repatriation, and no violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner for any purpose whatsoever (but see Paragraph 7 below). This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. This Commission shall ensure that prisoners of war shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention, and with the general spirit of that Convention.

II

CUSTODY OF PRISONERS OF WAR

4. All prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to repatriation following the effective date of the Armistice Agreement shall be released from the military control and from the custody of the detaining side as soon as practicable, and in all cases within sixty (60) days subsequent to the effective date of the Armistice Agreement to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at locations in Korea to be designated by the detaining side.

5. At the time the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission assumes custody of the prisoner of war, the military forces of the detaining side shall be withdrawn therefrom, so that the locations specified in the preceding Paragraph shall be taken over completely by the armed forces of India.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 3 above, the detaining side shall have the responsibility for maintaining and ensuring security and order in the areas where locations where the prisoners of war are in custody and for preventing and restraining any armed forces (including irregular bodies of military personnel) in the area under its control from any acts of disturbance and intrusion against the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.

7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 3 above, the neutral nations shall be entitled to free representation as derogating from the authority of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war under its temporary jurisdiction.

III

EXPLANATION

8. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, after having received and taken into custody all those prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated, shall immediately make arrangements so that within ninety (90) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission takes over the custody, the nations to which the prisoners of war belong shall have freedom and facilities to send representatives to the locations where such prisoners of war are in custody to explain to all the prisoners of war dependent upon these nations their rights and to inform them of any matters relating to their return to their homelands, particularly of their full freedom to return home to lead a peaceful life, under the following provisions:

a. The number of such explaining representatives shall be seven (7) per thousand prisoners of war held in custody by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission; and the minimum authorization for each of the total of five (5):

b. The hours during which the explaining representatives shall have access to the prisoners shall be as determined by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and generally in accord with Article 58 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War;

c. All explanations and interviews shall be conducted in the presence of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and a representative of the detaining side.

d. Additional provisions governing the explanation work shall be prescribed by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and will be designed to ensure the greater benefits contained in Paragraph 3 above and in this Paragraph.

e. The explaining representatives, while engaging in their work, shall be allowed to bring with them necessary facilities and personnel for wireless communications.

9. Prisoners of war in its custody shall have freedom and facilities to make representations and communications to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to representatives and subordinate bodies of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to inform them of their desires on any matter which may concern them, or in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

IV

DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

10. Any prisoner of war who, while in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, decides to exercise the right of repatriation, shall make an application requesting repatriation to a body consisting of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Once such an application is made, it shall be considered immediately by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission or one of its subordinate bodies so as to determine immediately by majority vote the validity of such application. Once such an application is made and validated by the Commission or one of its subordinate bodies, the prisoner of war concerned shall be immediately transferred to and accommodated in the tents set up for those who are ready to be repatriated. Thereafter, he shall be included in the list of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission; be delivered forthwith to the prisoner of war exchange point at Panmunjom, for repatriation, under the procedure prescribed in the Armistice Agreement.

11. At the expiration of ninety (90) days after the transfer of custody of the prisoners of war to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, access of representatives of captured personnel as provided for in Paragraph 8 above, shall terminate, and the question of disposition of war prisoners whose right to be repatriated shall be submitted to the Political Conference recommended to be convened in accordance with Article 38 of the Armistice Agreement which shall endeavour to settle this question within thirty (30) days during which period the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, shall declare the release from custody of any prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated and for whom no other disposition has been agreed to by the Political Conference within one hundred and twenty (120) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has assumed their custody. Thereafter, access of representatives of each individual, those who choose to go to neutral nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission of India. This operation shall be completed within thirty (30) days after the expiration of this period. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall immediately cease its functions and declare its dissolution.
VI

RED CROSS VISITATION

12. Essential Red Cross service for prisoners of war in custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be provided for by India in accordance with regulations issued by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

VII

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR PRISONERS OF WAR

14. Each side shall provide logistical support for the prisoners of war in the area under its military control, delivering required support to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at an agreed delivery point in the vicinity of each prisoner of war installation.

15. The cost of repatriating prisoners of war to the exchange point at Panmunjom shall be borne by the detaining side and the cost from the exchange point by the side on which said prisoners depend, in accordance with Article 118 of the Geneva Convention.

16. The Red Cross Society of India shall be responsible for providing such general service personnel around the prisoner of war installations as required by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

17. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall provide medical support for the prisoners of war as may be practicable. The detaining side shall request the assistance of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission specifically for those cases requiring extensive medical care or hospitalization. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall maintain complete treatment, prisoners of war shall be returned to a prisoner of war installation as specified in Paragraph 4 above.

18. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission is entitled to obtain from both sides such legitimate assistance as it may require in carrying out its duties and tasks. But both sides shall neither under any name and in any form interfere with thetery Commission, the authorities or the localities wherein they are responsible for assisting them in returning to their home lands.

VIII

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION COMMISSION

19. Each side shall be responsible for providing logistical support for the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission stationed in the area under its military control, and both sides shall contribute on an equal basis to such support within the Demilitarized Zone. The precise arrangements shall be subject to determination by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the detaining side in each case.

20. Each of the detaining sides shall be responsible for protecting the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission from the other side while in transit over lines of communication within its area, as set forth in Paragraph 23 for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, to a place of residence and while in residence within the vicinity of the points where the prisoners of war are in custody. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be responsible for the security of such representatives within the actual limits of the areas where the prisoners of war are in custody.

21. Each of the detaining sides shall be responsible for providing transportation, housing, communication and other logistical support to the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission while in its areas under its military control. Such services shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.

IX

PUBLICATION

22. After the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the terms of this agreement shall be made known to all prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining side, have not exercised their right to be repatriated.

X

MOVEMENT

23. The movement of the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be provided for by India in accordance with the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. A map showing these lines of communication shall be furnished to the command of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Movement of such personnel, except within locations as designated in Paragraph 4 above shall be under the control of, and escorted by, personnel of the side in whose area the travel is being undertaken; however, such movement shall not be subject to any obstruction or coercion.

XI

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

24. The interpretation of this agreement shall rest with the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and/or any subordinate body to which functions are delegated or assigned by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, shall operate on the basis of a majority vote.

25. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall submit a weekly report to the opposing Commanders on the status of prisoners of war in its custody, indicating the numbers repatriated and remaining at the end of each week.

26. When this agreement has been acceded to by both sides and by the five (5) powers named herein, it shall become effective upon the date the Armistice becomes effective.
TEMPORARY AGREEMENT SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

In order to meet the requirements of the dispositions of the prisoners of war not for direct repatriation in accordance with the provisions of the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the one hand, and the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the other hand, in pursuance of the provisions in Paragraph 3, Article IV of the Agreement concerning a military armistice in Korea, agree to conclude the following temporary Agreement supplementary to the Armistice Agreement:

1. Under the provisions of Paragraphs 4 and 5, Article II of the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, the United Nations Command has the right to designate the area between the Military Demarcation Line and the eastern and southern boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone between the Imjin River on the south and the road leading southeast from Okum-ni on the northeast (the main road leading southeast from Panmunjom not included), as the area wherein the United Nations Command will turn over the prisoners of war which are not directly repatriated and which the United Nations Command has the responsibility for keeping under its custody, to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of the Korean People's Volunteers for custody. The United Nations Command shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, inform the Chinese People's Volunteers of the approximate figures by nationality of such prisoners of war in its custody.

2. If there are prisoners of war under their custody who request not to be directly repatriated, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers have the right to designate the area in the vicinity of Panmunjom between the Military Demarcation Line and the western and northern boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone, as the area wherein which such prisoners of war will be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. After knowing that there are prisoners of war under their custody who request not to be directly repatriated, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers shall inform the United Nations Command side of the approximate figures by nationality of such prisoners of war.

3. In accordance with Paragraphs 8, 9 and 10, Article I of the Armistice Agreement, the following paragraphs are hereby provided:

a. After the cease-fire comes into effect, unarmed personnel of each side shall be specifically authorised by the Military Armistice Commission to enter the above-mentioned areas designated by their own side to perform necessary construction operations. None of such personnel shall remain in the above-mentioned areas upon the completion of the construction operations.

b. A definite number of prisoners of war as decided upon by both sides, who are in the respective custody of both sides and who are not directly repatriated, shall be specifically authorised by the Military Armistice Commission to be escorted respectively by a certain number of armed forces of the detaining sides to the above-mentioned areas of custody designated respectively by both sides to be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. After the prisoners of war have been taken over, the armed forces of the detaining sides shall be withdrawn immediately from the areas of custody to the area under the control of their own side.

c. The personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and its subordinate bodies, the armed forces of India, the Red Cross Society of India, the explaining representatives and observation representatives of both sides, as well as the required material and equipment, for exercising the functions provided for in the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be specifically authorised by the Military Armistice Commission to have the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the above-mentioned areas designated respectively by both sides for the custody of prisoners of war.

4. The provisions of Sub-paragraph be of this agreement shall not be construed as derogating from the privileges enjoyed by those personnel mentioned above under Paragraph 11, Article I of the Armistice Agreement.

5. This agreement shall be abrogated upon the conclusion of the mission provided for in the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

LEGEND TO MAP OF MILITARY DEMARcation LINE

The delegations of both sides to the Korean armistice negotiations have revised and finally ratified the military demarcation line according to the actual line of contact between both sides.

The finally ratified military demarcation line starts from Kangjong, six kilometres to the southeast of Kosong on the east coast, goes south-westwards to Toksa-ni to the south of Kosong, then follows the eastern bank of Nam River through Pungdo, Sindae-ni, Kuman-ni, and then southwards along the Nam River to Sintan-ni, runs south-westwards to Chanchane 21.5 kilometres west of Kumsong, one kilometre south of Changsung-ni, one and a half kilometres south of Sohui-ni, half kilometre north of Kacchi-tong from Satae-ni westwards to Munding-ni, then passes a point three kilometres south of Ounj-ni and westwards reaches the Pulchae River on a point one kilometre south of Sunchonbuk. The line then goes north-westwards through a point near fifty three points south of Kacchi-ni and runs westwards and meets the Kumgangchon at Tungsan-ni and then runs westwards along the Kumgangchon to a point one kilometre southeast of Sekyong-ni and then runs westwards through a point nine and half kilometres south of Kumgangchon, runs south-westwards through a point three kilometres south of Kyojon-ni and another point one half kilometres south of Sangsamuyong and then runs westwards to a point one kilometre south of Kumgang-ni and to Sinmalek 11.5 kilometres south of Pyongsung, to Yujung-ni eight kilometres north of the above. The line then goes south-westwards through Simhyon-ni 13 kilometres west of Chorwon, to Tuyong-ni seven kilometres east of Sinmyong and then runs northwards westwards at wider angles through Kyesong-ni to the Imjin River. It then goes along the Imjin River to a point half a
MAP 1 Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarised Zone. (See Paragraphs 2 & 3)

Chorwon and west of Yechon, the total area involved being 53 square kilometres. This shows that changes during this period in the actual line of contact between both sides nearly all involved southward advances.

After the demarcation line was fixed for the second time, the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement was delayed for more than one month owing to the Syngman Rhee clique's sabotage of the agreement and opposition to the armistice. During this month or more, the actual line of contact between both sides again underwent a change. Accordingly, both sides in the Korean armistice negotiations revised the military demarcation line for the third time on July 24. During this month or more, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers again pushed southward in eight places along the whole line to the extent of 182.6 square kilometres, making a total of 329.2 square kilometres southward as compared with the military demarcation line as defined at first. The major changes were in the districts south of Kumsong, where the battlefield shifted nine kilometres southward. This straightened the curve running from 14 kilometres to the southeast, through 0.5 kilometres to the south, to 10 kilometres to the southwest of Kumsong, an advance amounting to 769.3 square kilometres. In addition, the advance of the Korean-Chinese people's forces along the east coast caused a southward change of a quarter of a kilometre from the starting point of the military demarcation line, and the advance northward of the 3rd Provisional Army made an eastward shift of one kilometre. In that part of the military demarcation line that crossed
ELABORATION OF SPECIAL POINTS IN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

Two comparatively special questions are dealt with in the Korean Armistice Agreement. These relate to the use of the waters of the Han River Estuary and the withdrawal by the other side from the islands along the coast in the rear of the Korean and Chinese side. Here are some points introducing these two special questions:

1. Paragraph 5 of the Korean Armistice Agreement provides: "The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side...Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side."

The Han River has its source in Otase-san in the eastern part of Korea. It passes through Seoul and Kumpo and turns to the north to meet with the Imjin River. Then it flows east to west into the Hwanghae (Yellow Sea). The Estuary where the Han River and the Imjin River meet and from which the Han River enters the sea stretches for a length of approximately 10 kilometers. Since November, 1951, this side and the enemy side have faced each other in this area across the two sides of the river. The Military Demarcation Line established under the Korean Armistice Agreement (see Paragraph 5 & 6) according to the actual line of contact is along the Han River between both sides. The Koreans living along the banks of the Han River, before the outbreak of the Korean war earned their living by shipping and fishing. With the cessation of the war, the waters of the Han River Estuary could be open to civil shipping and conditions should be created to allow the local population to resume their peaceful life. During the negotiations, however, the enemy side attempted to use the Han River Estuary for military shipping and put forward the proposal that it should be "open to all shipping of both sides." This would not only make it impossible to guarantee a stable armistice but would endanger civil shipping. As a result of the opposition and the persistent effort by the Korean and Chinese side, the two opposing sides finally agreed that the waters of the Han River Estuary should be open to the civilian shipping of both sides. This brought a just solution to the question of the use of the waters of the Han River Estuary.

2. Paragraph 13, b. of the Korean Armistice Agreement provides that the Commanders of the opposing sides shall, within 10 days after the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all their military forces, supplies and equipment from the other side's rear and the coastal islands and waters in Korea. Among the various unreasonable claims put forward by the enemy during the negotiations, they showed unwillingness to withdraw from the coastal islands in the rear of this side, taking the Military Demarcation Line as the boundary. Moreover, using the argument that certain islands were under their control, they demanded that they be compensated for those islands from which they were to withdraw by an equivalent area in Kaseong which was in the hands of this side. This, the Korean and Chinese side resolutely opposed. The Korean and Chinese side insisted that the Imjin River Estuary at the western end of the Military Demarcation Line should be extended along the middle of Han River and the provincial boundary of Hwanghae-do (Province) and Kyonggi-do (Province) to the sea as the line between both sides and that the other side must withdraw from all islands located to the north of the Military Demarcation Line and this provincial boundary. Through the persistence and efforts of this side, an agreement relating to the withdrawal from the islands was reached between both sides, and this is incorporated in Paragraph 13, b. of the Armistice Agreement. With the exception of the island groups of P'omyong-do, Tsowchong-do, Sochong-do, Yongchong-do and Ud-do, which are to be under the control of the other side, the other side is to withdraw, within 10 days after the Armistice Agreement comes into effect, from all the islands to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between Hwanghae-do (Province) and Kyonggi-do (Province) and the islands are to be put under the military control of this side. All the islands lying to the south of the above boundary line shall be placed under the military control of the other side. No disputes took place between the two sides during the negotiations regarding withdrawal from the islands on the eastern coast of Korea. After the armistice, the enemy side shall, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 13, b. of the Armistice Agreement, withdraw from the islands which were under the control of this side on June 24, 1950, within 10 days after the agreement comes into effect.

Thus under the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, the enemy side, after the Korean armistice, should withdraw from the principal islands along the sea in the rear of this side. On the western coast of Korea, these are Ch'is-do, Soh-do, Wonsan-do, Kiro-do, Ch'iento, etc. On the eastern coast of Korea, these are Yo-do, Ung-do, Sin-do, etc. All these islands are now occupied by puppet Rhee troops and U.S.-Rhee special agents. The Armistice Agreement provides that these military forces fail to withdraw within 10 days after the Armistice Agreement comes into effect and without mutually-agreed and valid reasons for the postponement of the withdrawal, the other side has the right to take any action they consider necessary for the maintenance of peace and order.
EXPLANATIONS TO MAPS OF PORTS OF ENTRY

To ensure the stability of the military armistice and so to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, it is stipulated, in accordance with sections c and d of Paragraph 13 of the Korean Armistice Agreement, that the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel, combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons and ammunition shall cease. However, military personnel may be rotated on a man-for-man basis and combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on a piece-for-piece basis by others of the same effectiveness and type. These personnel and equipment are to be introduced into or taken out of Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43. Five ports of entry are set forth on each side. On the Korean-Chinese side are:

Sinuiju (60 degrees 6 minutes North, 124 degrees 24 minutes East),
Changjin (41 degrees 46 minutes North, 129 degrees 49 minutes East),
Hungnam (39 degrees 56 minutes North, 127 degrees 37 minutes East),
Mampo (41 degrees 9 minutes North, 126 degrees 19 minutes East),
Sinanju (39 degrees 36 minutes North, 125 degrees 36 minutes East).

Sinuiju and Mampo are two cities near the border of the People's Republic of China and are important gateways leading to the People's Republic of China. Convenient for traffic, they are linked by railway and highway to other major cities in Korea. Sinanju is in the hinterland of Korea close to the west coast, on the south bank of the Chongchon River, and is an important communication centre. Changjin and Hungnam are two ports on the east coast.

The five ports of entry on the opposite side are:
Inchon (37 degrees 29 minutes North, 126 degrees 39 minutes East),
Taegu (35 degrees 52 minutes North, 124 degrees 36 minutes East),
Pusan (35 degrees 6 minutes North, 129 degrees 2 minutes East),
Kangnung (37 degrees 45 minutes North, 125 degrees 54 minutes East),
Kunsan (35 degrees 59 minutes North, 126 degrees 43 minutes East).

Inchon, Pusan and Kunsan are military ports. Inchon and Pusan are the biggest ports of Korea which can easily be reached either by land, sea or air. Inchon and Kunsan are on the west coast. Pusan is on the south coast and Kangnung is on the east coast. And Taegu is in the interior where the biggest recruiting centre of the puppet Syngman Rhee troops is located.

As to the lines of communication, it is laid down in Paragraph 13 (g) of the Armistice Agreement: "According to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 (e) over main lines of communication agreed upon by both sides, and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred."

The lines of communication referred to here were meant mainly to facilitate movement of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams to inspect various specified ports of entry in the rear and areas other than the Demilitarized Zone. Every specified port of entry has only one line of communication. The main one—a class one motor-road—is that which runs from Pusan, through Taegu, Seoul, Kangnung, P'yongyang, Sinanju to Sinuiju. All lines of communication are motor-roads with motor vehicles as the means of travel.

After the armistice, the commanders of the two opposing sides have the obligation to stop the entry of reinforcing military personnel and equipment from outside Korea. On the question of the method of supervision, the other side had repeatedly brought up unreasonable demands at the conference table, designed for interference in the internal affairs of Korea. For instance, under the pretext of inspection, the demand was made that free entry of its military personnel into the whole of Korea be allowed. Hence this was firmly opposed by this side. It was finally established that the neutral nations carry out the function of supervision, and the ports of entry in the rear were fixed at the places through which military personnel and equipment come into or leave Korea, subject to the inspection and investigation of Neutral Nations Inspection Teams dispatched by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

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