

No. 37 September 14, 1981

# BEIJING REVIEW

北京周報

A CHINESE WEEKLY  
OF  
NEWS AND VIEWS

- Education: Achievements and Principles
- Causes of the "Cultural Revolution"
- A Year of the Suzuki Cabinet



## HIGHLIGHTS OF THE WEEK

### Achievements in Education

Minister of Education Jiang Nanxiang lists some of the major achievements in China's education and the principles followed since liberation (p. 7).

### Causes of "Cultural Revolution"

An analytical article discusses the immediate and underlying historical and social causes of the "cultural revolution" and the reasons why it could last a whole decade from 1966 to 1976 (p. 15).

### Soviet Statement Refuted

A Soviet statement concerning the disputed area of the Chinese-Soviet frontier in the Pamirs was refuted by Chinese Foreign Ministry sources as fabrications to whitewash il-

legal Soviet occupation of Chinese territory (p. 21).

### Unity Against Vietnamese Invaders

Leaders of three Kampuchean patriotic groups met in Singapore and issued a joint statement pledging to carry on the struggle and fight together for the liberation of their country from the Vietnamese aggressors (p. 9).

### Distortion of Ho Chi Minh's Will

Hoang Van Hoan, former Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Workers' Party, exposed the distortion of the late President Ho Chi Minh's last will by Le Duan (p. 10).

### The Suzuki Government: A Review

Zenko Suzuki took over the premiership of Japan a year ago. What are his achievements in domestic and international affairs? What lies in store for his cabinet? (p. 12).

### Tribute to a Stage Artist

A four-day Beijing opera festival was held last month to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the death of Mei Lanfang, a world-famous stage artist (p. 28).



Ma Shuzhen, a special grade teacher in a primary school, teaching her pupils new words.

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### Eurocommunism

The Communist Party of China has restored relations with some Communist Parties which advocate "Eurocommunism." Does the CPC agree with their views?

Restoration of relations does not mean that the CPC and those Parties share identical views on all questions. It is normal that there are differences in view between Parties; they can exchange opinions and failure to reach an agreement does not hinder the development of normal relations.

We always maintain that a Communist Party can find a correct road only by integrating the basic principles of Marxism with the concrete practice of its

own country. It was in this way that the CPC won victory in the revolution. The road of the Chinese revolution is different from that of the October Revolution; other countries also should not mechanically follow the Chinese road. In short, no country should blindly copy the experience of another.

It is not proper to say at random whether the revolutionary road of those Parties advocating "Eurocommunism" is correct or not. This can be judged only by the people of their own countries and the people of Europe as a whole, and tested by their own revolutionary practice.

— *International Editor Mu Youlin*

### Differences Between Localities

Economic development in the various provinces of China is quite uneven. Are those localities with a low income hard pressed?

It is true that there is a great difference in the level of economic development in various parts of China. Generally speaking, the eastern coastal areas are more developed than areas in the interior, especially the remote western border areas inhabited by the minority peoples. For instance, per-capita national income in Shanghai (including its 10 suburban counties whose population accounts for 40 per cent of the municipality's total of 11 million) was 1,600 US dollars in 1980, whereas in some northwestern provinces and autonomous regions, it is only about 100 US dollars.

Such differences are the result of historical and social reasons which have existed for a long time. China is a unitary multi-national country. There are 55 minority nationalities in addition to the Hans. Before liberation, some of them had similar social systems as the Han nationality, some were still in the stage of serfdom and a few maintained the primitive communal system. But they all entered the stage of socialism at practically the same time. This is why the backwardness in economic development is most obvious in areas inhabited by the minority peoples.

It is impossible to eradicate these differences overnight. But the state must make efforts to enable the less developed areas to expand production con-

tinuously, improve the people's livelihood and step by step narrow the gap between them and the more advanced areas. The people will be happy if this is done. Otherwise, there might be trouble.

Since the founding of the People's Republic, China has adopted a policy of national regional autonomy. A new type of relationship of equality, unity and mutual assistance has been established among the various nationalities. The state has extended considerable financial and technical aid to help develop the economy and cultural undertakings in areas inhabited by minority nationalities. For instance, from 1952 to 1980, the state allocated 5,000 million yuan to Tibet as financial aid (an average of 3,000 yuan per person), and at the same time the 128 million yuan the Tibetan local government handed over to the state as taxes were also entirely ploughed back for local development.

Practice has proved that these policies and measures are effective. In 1979, the total output value of industry, agriculture and animal husbandry in the minority areas was 10.26 times as much as that of 1949, and the livelihood of the people there has improved. Unfortunately, however, during the 10 tumultuous years of the "cultural revolution," these policies were wrongly criticized, thereby adversely affecting the situation. Had it not been for this, their economy would have developed more quickly. It is after the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee held in 1978 that the policy of national regional autonomy was again implemented in earnest.



# LETTERS

## Mistakes and Achievements

In all of the issues of *Beijing Review*, there have been articles concerning the "Left" mistakes that were made such as the "cultural revolution." I would suggest to you that any further reference to these "mistakes" is tantamount to "beating a dead horse." While it is important to recognize mistakes, it is not necessary to dwell on them. The People's Republic of China has come a long way in its relatively short history and has accomplished much. I saw no beggars on the streets of Beijing and everyone seemed to be well-fed and clothed. This in itself is truly a great accomplishment. Your people can now look at the Imperial Palace, the Great Wall, the Temple of Heaven with the assurance that the despots who built them with the sacrifice of untold thousands are gone for ever. The young people can look at the museums and monuments and realize how fortunate they are.

**B.T. Newman**  
Dedham, Ma., USA

## Unnecessary Repetitions

On the whole one finds the "Articles and Documents" and the "Special Features" interesting, though it is thought that there is often undue repetition, making these items unnecessarily rather long-winded. Better to be brief

In recent years, more flexible economic policies have been adopted for autonomous areas inhabited by minority peoples and other economically backward provinces. These policies include giving the production teams or brigades more power to make their own decisions, allowing the commune members larger plots of land and more domestic animals for private use, increasing financial subsidies and reduction or exemption of taxes. In addition, they are also encouraged to establish

and to the point. This would hold your readers' interest better.

One would like to see references to the gang of four's activities cut down. They belong to the distant past. You seem to want to keep them indefinitely in the present. Undue repetition mentioned above refers here as well.

With a population of 1,000 million, there must be an infinite variety of scenes and subjects to draw upon. But we get less and less of how China is developing, and more and more of what correspondents think of international situations. One should appreciate a better balance in favour of China news.

**G. Selk**  
Nedlands, Australia

## The Sino-Soviet Boundary Question

Recently, I read with great interest "The Crux of the Sino-Soviet Boundary Question" in issue No. 31. This kind of article can clarify many questions. The world's people should not forget that tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union have occupied territories of many neighbouring countries, for instance, territories of Finland, Romania, Turkey, China and Japan. Now the actions of the Soviet government are more outrageous than that of tsarist Russia. It defies the sovereignty of its neighbouring countries and international law. This really concerns people. The sovereignty of various countries is sacred and inviolable. But the Soviet Union

voluntary and mutually beneficial economic ties with the big industrial centres on the eastern seaboard so as to get more funds and technical assistance for construction and economic and cultural development. Initial results of such ties have proved to be satisfactory and the people are happy. Though there is still a long way to go in reducing the differences between these areas, the prospects are good.

—Economic Editor  
Wang Dacheng

totally disregards this; their actions in Afghanistan clearly reveal this. All these outrageous aggressive actions should be strongly condemned. However, we must not only condemn them, but also struggle against them.

**J. Paul Tarrieux**  
Hagetmau, France

## International Reports

International articles keep one up to date on what is going on in the world, especially when news is often suppressed or misinterpreted by our press. Examples are "Gonsalves' Untimely Remarks" (issue No. 23) which was not reported in our press and events in Kampuchea. This section I find most informative.

**W.H. Ley**  
Northland, New Zealand

In general I find *Beijing Review* very interesting. Most important to me is information about what is going on in China, but I also enjoy reading the editor's opinions about international questions. Certain problems are mentioned in almost every issue to the point where they become somewhat monotonous. Such are the denunciations of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the protests about Vietnamese action in Kampuchea.

**Malcolm E. McIntosh**  
Washington, USA

Sometimes too much on one area—boring a casual reader. Why so little on Europe—I was looking forward to your comments on "the wedding of the century"—and you skipped it.

**Marjorie A. Simmons**  
Oregon, USA

## "Humour in China"

I dislike the column "Humour in China" at the beginning of the year. But, since issue No. 13, I began enjoying it because it has made an obvious improvement—its subjects are clearer and more pointed. I feel that the column in the first 12 issues lacked the cohesiveness of a story—not only were the cartoons not interesting, but they also confused the readers. Now I can appreciate the cartoons because of the improvements in their presentation.

**Nyembo-Ilunga**  
Kamina, Zaire



## POLITICAL

## Investigation and Research

"Who are you looking for?" an old woman asked a stranger she had never met before.

"I just drop in to have a look. I heard that this road has caused you a lot of trouble and I've come to apologize for our bad work," answered the visitor.

"Who are you?" asked the old woman, somewhat puzzled.

The visitor was Liu Sicong, secretary of the Urumqi city Party committee in northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. He was on an inspection tour of the residential quarters after he had learnt that a road had fallen into disrepair, giving inconvenience to the people living in that area.

Before long, a repair team was sent there and the road was resurfaced, to the great delight of the inhabitants.

To investigate and study the actual situation is a method consistently upheld by the Chinese Communist Party. During the period of revolutionary wars and in the period of socialist construction, it has become a regular practice for leading cadres at various levels to go to the grass-roots units to investigate the situation there and help solve problems promptly. Experiences thus gained are then summed up to serve as a guide for other work. Comrade Mao Zedong wrote many of his works after careful investigation and study. But owing to health and other reasons, he failed in his late years to keep to this method which is effective in overcoming bureaucratism.

After the gang of four was toppled, the Party's fine traditions have been revived and cadres are urged to carry out investigations and study in order to give better leadership.

Xiao Hua, secretary of the provincial Party committee of Gansu in northwest China, not long ago spent 10 days in three counties of a Tibet autonomous prefecture in the southern part of the province. There he made inquiries about the eco-

nomic construction and the relationship between the different nationalities. He visited a number of production teams, schools and the homes of peasants and herdsmen, made investigations of the pastures and herds, and solicited opinions at discussion meetings with commune and production brigade leaders as well as the peasants and herdsmen. The report he wrote based on his investigations was well received by all concerned.

*Renmin Ribao*, the Party organ, recently gave prominent coverage to two examples. One was about 87-year-old Hu Juewen, Vice-Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and Chairman of the China Democratic National Construction Association, who made an investigation of the industrial achievements in Changzhou in east China's Jiangsu Province. Another was about Minister of Textile Industry Hao Jianxiu who went all the way to areas inhabited by the minority nationalities in southwest China's Yunnan and Guizhou Provinces in order to know what articles of clothing the minority peoples need and what textiles they produce.

## ECONOMIC

## Joint Enterprise Makes Fresh Progress

A special feature carried in *Beijing Review* issue No. 31 last year reported on how an enterprise combining agriculture, industry and commerce, set up in the city of Chongqing in southwest China's Sichuan Province, had demonstrated its advantages in its early days. How is this enterprise—the Changjiang Integrated Com-



Hao Jianxiu (middle). Minister of Textile Industry, visiting a cotton mill in Xian.





A condensed milk workshop run by an integrated company in Sichuan.

pany — faring now? Is it a going concern?

A news report frontpaged in *Renmin Ribao* on August 20 this year said that since it was set up in 1979, the company's farm and sideline products and processed goods have greatly replenished supplies on the urban market. The milk it produces now accounts for 80 per cent of the total amount supplied to Chongqing while its oranges (a Sichuan specialty) and tea account for 70 and 20 per cent respectively.

A merger of 26 state-owned dairy farms, orchards, tea plantations and fish farms, the Changjiang Integrated Company has widened its scope of operation to rural people's communes. The article said that it now has 23 production centres, four branch companies at the county level, two specialized branch companies, more than 50 plants and workshops for processing farm and sideline products and over 50 stores.

Four specialized production groups have been formed for oranges, milk, tea and fish. At the same time the company has been co-operating with some factories in the vicinity along five specialized lines, and has established economic contacts with over 100 departments in a dozen or so provinces and municipalities. In its first year the company has changed the situation in which its member farms were losing money for years running. In 1980 it netted a profit totalling 3.85 million yuan, more than double that of the previous year. The first half of this year saw its profit increase by 20 per cent over that of the same period of last year.

Together with this news report was a *Renmin Ribao* editorial which said that China, with a weak economic foundation, cannot rely solely on state funds to achieve the modernization of its agriculture. The editorial said that emphasis should be placed mainly on the strength of the rural collective economy by giving full scope to the superiority of our abundant resources and manpower, developing a diversified economy and quickening the pace of accumulation through the economic integration of production, processing of farm and sideline products and marketing.

For a long time in the past the rural areas only supplied raw materials and the peasants were not allowed to develop trade and industry. Co-ordination between production, supply and marketing left much to be desired, and the channels of circulation of goods were far too few. The peasants had to sell their products at a low price but pay a high price for what they needed. Because the farm products had to be ship-

ped to factories in far-away cities to be processed, large quantities of by-products which could be used as fodder or fertilizer were not shipped back to the countryside. Moreover, the concentration of population in the cities has resulted in lopsided development of the cities, thereby widening the gap between the cities and the countryside. Enterprises combining agriculture, industry and commerce have provided an ideal way to solve these problems. This is because specialization and socialization of production requires that agriculture, industry and commerce should co-ordinate and that production, supply and marketing should dovetail with each other.

The editorial pointed out that such integrated enterprises are set up on a voluntary basis to benefit all the partners involved, with due consideration for the interests of the state, the collective, the producers and the consumers as well.

Discretion should be exercised, the editorial cautioned, in setting up such enterprises because they have an important bearing on the rural areas and on effecting structural changes in agriculture as a whole. Experiments should be carried out only in a few selected places.

While one should be bold in experimenting with new ways of management, measures taken should be prudent. Past experiences show that the launching of large-scale movements is not an advisable way of doing agricultural work, the editorial concluded.

## Extortion of "Commissions" Prohibited

A cadre in east China's Anhui Province recently wrote to the provincial Party committee,



saying: The director of an arts and crafts factory went to a textile machinery plant to buy some machine parts, but the answer he got was "out of stock." Later, however, when he gave the men in charge some embroidered quilt covers and packages of tea, he quickly got what he wanted.

This form of extorting "commissions" is rather common in the course of commodity circulation in China today. In the past, the means of production were distributed to the enterprises in accordance with a unified state plan, so there were no such extortions. After the reform of economic structure in 1979, the enterprises have the power of self-management and some means of production can be sold as commodities on the market. But owing to the lack of a proper market management system, unhealthy tendencies have begun to emerge. Some enterprises resort to what amounts to bribery to get raw materials, sell their own products or conclude contracts, with the result that "middlemen" or purchasing and sales personnel sometimes receive money or gifts valued at several thousand yuan. Cases of such bribery usually occur in collectively owned enterprises and sometimes also in large enterprises owned by the whole people.

The State Council recently issued a circular calling for an immediate end to this malpractice. The circular forbids all enterprises and undertakings giving their purchasing and sales personnel money for buying gifts or inviting people to dinner to get things done. Anyone who accepts or extorts "commissions" will be punished

for bribery or embezzlement. Regulations prohibiting such "commissions" in foreign trade will be worked out separately.

The circular urged that a socialist style of doing business be fostered, pointing out that competition under socialism should be different from that under capitalism. Exchange of commodities between socialist economic units should be based on equality, co-operation, mutual assistance and mutual benefit. Unhealthy tendencies in the course of commodity circulation are detrimental to the socialist economic system; they obstruct the work of economic readjustment and structural reform and adversely affect competition between socialist enterprises. At the same time, they seriously corrupt the minds of some people and undermine social ethics.

The circular criticized some responsible members of leading departments and enterprises for their laissez-faire attitude towards this malpractice. Some leading cadres even encourage

and connive at those who take advantage of their positions to seek personal gains. From now on, the circular emphasized, leading comrades will be held responsible for cases of such extortions.


## EDUCATIONAL

### Achievements and Principles

How should one evaluate New China's educational work?

For a period of time, undue criticism was directed at its shortcomings because of the serious setback sustained during the "cultural revolution," while its achievements since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 were often underestimated.

At a recent national conference on political and ideological work in the schools, Minister of Education Jiang Nanxiang pointed out that achievements in education over the past 32 years occupy the first place. He added that a correct appraisal of the



TV college students in Jiading County on the outskirts of Shanghai learning how to administer anaesthetics.



intellectuals trained in. New China should be made and that we must not lose confidence in ourselves.

Over the past 32 years, about 9 million people with professional skills have been trained in New China's institutions of higher learning and secondary technical schools. They love the socialist motherland, support the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and work actively for socialism and the people. They are playing an important role on various fronts and serve as the backbone force in China's modernization drive.

Jiang Nanxiang listed the following achievements in education:

—The socialist transformation of old China's educational system has been completed and a new socialist system has been established;

—Schools at various levels and of various types have made great progress. In 1980, the total enrolment was 204 million, of which 1.13 million were university and college students, whereas in old China college students numbered only a little over 100,000. And even in the peak pre-liberation year, the enrolment in various kinds of schools was only about 25 million;

—A large contingent of over 13 million educational workers has been trained.

**Mao Zedong on Education.** Minister Jiang stressed that the late Chairman Mao Zedong had put forth a series of guiding principles for China's education that are of far-reaching significance. They include:

—In educational policy, Mao Zedong said that people who receive an education should be enabled to develop morally, intellectually and physically and become workers with both so-

cialist consciousness and culture. He also held that education should be combined with productive labour and approved the system of part-time work and part-time study;

—Intellectuals play an important role in the revolution and construction. They should integrate themselves with the workers and peasants, and foster a proletarian world outlook through the study of Marxism-Leninism and learning from society and practice.

Mao Zedong's scientific theses on education are still the guiding principles for China's educational work. However, he also made some mistakes in this field. For instance, in his later years, he considered that the socialist schools of New China were just like the old schools ruled by bourgeois intellectuals, and he called for a thorough exposure and criticism of so-called "capitalist-roaders" and "reactionary academic authorities." He was also of the opinion that workers' propaganda teams should for ever occupy the leadership in educational institutions and that the poor and lower-middle peasants should manage the schools in the rural areas.

## FOREIGN RELATIONS

### Hu Yaobang Meets With Santiago Carrillo

During his meeting on August 29 with Santiago Carrillo, General Secretary of the Spanish Communist Party, Hu Yaobang, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, said: "The Chinese Communist Party appreciates the policies followed by the Spanish, Italian and other Com-

munist Parties, policies that combine the will of their own people with the principle of internationalism."

The two sides had a full exchange of views on issues of common interest.

General Secretary Carrillo arrived in Beijing on August 28 on his fourth visit to China. Last year when he visited Beijing, normal relations between the Chinese and Spanish Parties were restored.

### European Parliament Delegation

A delegation from the European Parliament, led by Gilles Martinet and composed of 17 MPs of major European countries and parties, visited China recently.

The delegation held discussions with members of the NPC Standing Committee. They exchanged views on the world situation, the economy in Europe, the political and economic situation in China and relations between China and the European Economic Community. They shared similar views on many issues.

Leaders of the NPC Standing Committee expressed China's support for the West European countries in their effort to become strong through unity and play an active and important part in international affairs. The Chinese people have always taken a positive attitude in developing friendly co-operation with the West European peoples. This, they said, is not only beneficial to both sides but also conducive to the maintenance of world peace and security. The two sides considered that there are broad prospects for co-operation in the economic, cultural, scientific and technological fields.



## Kampuchea Tripartite Meeting in Singapore

**L**EADERS of Kampuchea's three patriotic forces signed and released a joint statement after their meeting in Singapore on September 4. This augurs well for the joining of Kampuchea's patriotic forces to fight the Vietnamese aggressors.

In the past six months or so, the three patriotic forces have had several contacts and meetings with a view to bringing about their unity. In March this year, Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea Khieu Samphan conferred with Samdech Norodom Sihanouk in Pyongyang. He had three meetings with former Kampuchean Prime Minister Son Sann this year. Then, Sihanouk and Son Sann met in France early last month. These contacts helped bring the three parties closer to each other. ASEAN and some other countries have done much to promote their union and bring about the current tripartite meeting in Singapore.

### Vital Interest

The joint statement for the first time states explicitly their common desire for unity to combat Vietnamese aggression. This is of paramount significance. Their combined resistance would be a major guarantee for final victory over the Vietnamese aggressors and is therefore in the vital interest of the nation. The three parties have come together after a period of consultations and laid down the groundwork for their union and thus have charted the course ahead.

According to the joint statement, they decided to set up an ad hoc committee to study relevant questions concerning the formation of a coalition government. They also agreed that the different anti-Vietnamese forces should avoid clashes among themselves. Both are essential for their ultimate union.

The statement expressed unreserved support for the declaration and resolution of the International Conference on Kampuchea held in New York last July and the United Nations General Assembly resolutions on Kampuchea. All these documents call for the total withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea to allow the Kampuchean people to exercise their right to self-determination and to restore Kampuchea's neutral and non-aligned status. The patriotic Kampuchean forces' support for these documents proves that the basic principles pro-

claimed by the bulk of the world community in these documents represent the fundamental interests of the Kampuchean people and should be made the guidelines for a settlement of the Kampuchean problem.

### Tortuous Road

There will be a fair distance to go from the present Singapore meeting to actual union, and the going may yet prove to be rather tough and even tortuous. The three parties differ visibly in their views on domestic and external matters. They remain apart from each other when it comes to forming a coalition government. Much has yet to be done and obstacles have to be removed before a general agreement could be reached.

Faced with the harsh reality of 200,000 Vietnamese aggressor troops entrenched in their land, the patriotic forces share the primary and heavy responsibility of freeing the country from Viet Nam's occupation. Compared with this paramount duty, their differences are secondary after all. It is believed



Khieu Samphan, Sihanouk and Son Sann sign joint statement in Singapore.



## Joint Statement

**F**ORMER Kampuchean Head of State and Leader of the Kampuchean National Liberation Movement Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, former Kampuchean Prime Minister Son Sann, and President of the Præsidium of the State and Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea Khieu Samphan held their first formal meeting on September 2-4 in Singapore. After the meeting they issued a joint statement.

The three leaders agreed on the following four points:

1. Willing to form a Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea with a view to continuing the struggle in all forms for the liberation of Kampuchea from the Vietnamese aggressors.
2. Setting up an ad hoc committee to study the principles and the forms enabling the achievement of the above coalition government and the objective.
3. Full support for the declaration and resolution of the International Conference on Kampuchea and other relevant United Nations General Assembly resolutions on Kampuchea.
4. Appeal to all the peace-loving nations of the world to render their full support to the declaration and resolution of the International Conference on Kampuchea and other relevant United Nations General Assembly resolutions on Kampuchea.

In the statement, the three leaders agreed that all the anti-Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea should avoid any clashes among themselves. "They would refrain from bringing to the public their differences during the whole period of the agreement."

that having in mind the overriding interest of resisting the aggressors for national salvation, the three parties would be able to settle their differences by seeking common ground while reserving minor divergences through consultations.

All countries which cherish peace and justice are looking forward to the union of the patriotic Kampuchean forces and progress in the anti-Vietnamese struggle. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the Vietnamese authorities, the enemies of the Kampuchean people,

bitterly resent and hate this development. Recently, in anticipation of the Singapore talks, the Soviet mouthpieces have launched abusive attacks against the leaders of the three patriotic Kampuchean forces and slandered some ASEAN countries by name. But, whatever stratagems they may resort to, Moscow and Hanoi cannot hope to stem the progress of the Kampuchean struggle against the aggressor nor can they possibly prevent the struggle from winning ultimate victory.

—Xinhua Commentator

## Ho Chi Minh's Last Will Was Tampered With

—Hoang Van Hoan's Statement

Hoang Van Hoan, former Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Workers' Party who came to China in July 1979, declared on August 30 that the

last will of the late Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh was altered by Le Duan, now the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Viet Nam. Following is Hoang Van Hoan's statement. Subheads are ours. — Ed.

**S**OME time ago when I was considering what I was going to say to my countrymen both at home and abroad on the occasion of the founding anniversary of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, someone gave me a copy of the *Selected Works of Ho Chi Minh* reprinted on the orders of Le Duan. I read it through and found that more than 100 articles had been omitted and many others misrepresented. This reminded me of something that had been lying buried in my heart for 12 years. I think it is time I should tell the world about it so as to enable the Vietnamese people and the people the world over to know the truth, namely, *Le Duan had tampered with President Ho's last will and testament.* (Author's italics)

President Ho passed away at 09:47 hours on September 2, 1969. The Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee, unwilling to dampen the spirit of the people then celebrating National Day and preparing elaborate funeral arrangements, decided to hold the celebrations as usual and put off the release of the sad news until September 3.

### The First Version

Before President Ho's death, Members of the Political Bureau including myself who had been in attendance by his bedside discussed the need to come together to listen to his last will and testament. But



the idea was rejected by Le Duan. He said that as President Ho was no longer completely clear-minded he would probably be unable to express himself clearly even if he wanted to make any last behest. Thus our desire to hear President Ho's last will and testament was not fulfilled. Le Duan never mentioned the fact that President Ho had already made his last will and testament.

But no sooner had President Ho stopped breathing than Le Duan asked Members of the Political Bureau present to sit down. He unexpectedly brought out typewritten document of three or four pages bearing the signatures of President Ho and Le Duan. He asked someone to read it out, saying that it was President Ho's last will and testament prepared in advance. At the time, all of us present were so smitten with grief that we took whatever he said for granted.

### The Second Version

It was not until several days later after the funeral service and mourning activities that President Ho's last will and testament was published in the newspapers. However, it was a stereotyped "full text," and not a facsimile of the typed copy we had seen. The first paragraph of President Ho's last will and testament in his handwriting was published and it bore only the signature of President Ho. Le Duan's signature was left out.

Suddenly I was assailed by doubts.

The leader's last will and testament was an important political document of the Party.

If there was already a complete, typewritten full text bearing the signatures of President Ho and Le Duan, why wasn't a photostat copy of the document printed in the press? Why use a typeset version? Was it suppressed for fear of possible unfavourable public reaction because it was quite unreasonable for Le Duan's signature to appear on the typewritten copy?

President Ho Chi Minh's manuscripts are of historical significance. Why show only the first paragraph when there was a full text available? Had the original text been emasculated or tampered with by Le Duan to pass off as genuine?

After careful thought I had come to the conclusion that President Ho Chi Minh's last will and testament carried in the paper had been tampered with by Le Duan, notably the paragraph concerning the "international communist movement," in order to fit in with Le Duan's long-cherished anti-China stand.

### Ho Chi Minh's Stand

Everyone concerned with the international communist movement knows that rifts emerged within the movement in the late 1950s. The reason was the practice of revisionism by Nikita Khrushchov, who compelled fraternal parties and fraternal countries in the socialist camp to act in compliance with his stand and his line. China was resolutely opposed to this. So Khrushchov tried in every possible way to attack China. He even attempted to expel China from the international

communist movement and the socialist camp.

In August 1960, President Ho Chi Minh (accompanied by some others including myself) went personally to see Khrushchov to offer advice and explanation on this matter. However, throughout the meeting with Khrushchov in Yalta, President Ho was constantly interrupted by Khrushchov who clung to his anti-China stand. It was precisely Khrushchov's hostility towards China that brought about a split within the international communist movement. Some Parties supported the Soviet stand and opposed China. Other Parties supported China and opposed the Soviet stand. Although the Vietnamese Party did not openly oppose the Soviet Union, it supported China and took an anti-revisionist stand.

Under the chairmanship of President Ho, the Vietnamese Party's Central Committee repudiated revisionism at its Ninth Plenary Session at the end of 1963. The resolution of the session reads: "The modern revisionists have betrayed Marxism-Leninism," "the revisionists have brought the international communist movement to ideological chaos and an organizational split." It stresses the "need to fight revisionism—the root cause in the split in views in the socialist camp and the international communist movement."

After that, Soviet leaders time and again invited President Ho to go to the Soviet Union for a vacation, but he turned down such invitations. In November 1967, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decided to confer an



Order of Lenin on President Ho Chi Minh, but he also turned it down.

President Ho Chi Minh's attitude was crystal clear. However, his last will and testament as appeared in the newspapers contains the following paragraph on the international communist movement

"As a man who has devoted his whole life to the revolution, the more proud I am of the growth of the international communist and workers' movement, the more pained I am by the current discord among the fraternal Parties."

This made President Ho appear to be proud of the growth of the movement but at the same time feel disheartened with the movement. On the whole it made out that he seemed pained by the discord among the fraternal Parties, but not able to see the reasons for the discord and to distinguish right from wrong. This assertion is completely at variance with President Ho's stand and views and inconsistent with the anti-revisionist spirit of the resolution of the Party's Central Committee.

### Le Duan's Anti-China Line

Obviously, Le Duan had with extreme cunning substituted his own views for President Ho's views with the aim of providing a cover for his serv-

ing as a stooge of the anti-China reactionary forces in the international arena, a role which he had assumed secretly and for a long time. As a matter of fact, in the mid-60s, Le Duan had brought back with him from the Soviet Union a set of Wang Ming's theories and had covertly disseminated it among many cadres. By distorting President Ho's last will and testament when it was made public, it facilitated the implementation of the anti-China line he advocated.

This was the hidden and sinister intention of Le Duan in distorting President Ho's last will and testament.

To prove my point further, I demand that Le Duan make a clean breast to the press and immediately publish in full President Ho's last will and testament in the late President's own handwriting.

The entire Vietnamese people, including those who have or have not been deceived by Le Duan, have the right to ask him to do so. People the world over who are interested in Viet Nam, in defending truth and upholding justice also have the right to ask Le Duan to do so.

Le Duan's republication of the *Selected Works of Ho Chi Minh* with its many deletions and distortions is also the act of a political swindler. I reserve the right to make other exposures on other occasions.

into power by a large majority. He formed his cabinet and declared that he would continue Ohira's line and carry out a "policy of unity." The past year has seen the Suzuki cabinet holding all the political aces. The LDP has a stable majority in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors; within the LDP itself the mainstream faction consisting of three big groupings led by Suzuki, Takuei Tanaka and Takeo Fukuda has held sway. The chief members of the three groupings are installed in the cabinet and leading structures of the LDP so that there is a "whole party system," and not any one grouping monopolizing all the top posts. This has given the Suzuki cabinet a lot more clout in whipping up support in domestic affairs. In the Diet session ending in July, the cabinet tabled 74 bills and 69 of them were adopted. A 93.2 per cent rate of success, second only to the Ishiro Hatayama cabinet of 1954-56.

### United Against the Soviet Union

However, the political achievements of the Suzuki cabinet in foreign affairs outshine its performance in internal affairs. The "all-direction diplomacy" line in foreign policy was switched by Ohira when he was Prime Minister to "becoming a member of the West," that is, strengthening ties with the United States and Western Europe against the Soviet menace. Prime Minister Suzuki has carried on this line.

In the year since Suzuki became Prime Minister, Moscow has launched a series of offensives against Japan. It has tried to lure and to put pressure on Japan to make it change its

### Japan

## A Year of Suzuki Government

**The Zenko Suzuki cabinet has been in power for over a year. What political achievements has it made? And what lies ahead of it?**

**I**N July last year, Zenko Suzuki became President of the Liberal Democratic Party after

Masayoshi Ohira suddenly died and after the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had been swept



policy towards the Soviet Union. It has tried to prise Japan away from ties with the United States and with Western Europe, so as to separate and weaken them. At the end of August last year, Brezhnev in his speech delivered in Alma Ata proposed "separating politics from economics" and asked Japan to hold talks limited to Japan-Soviet economic co-operation and not to mention improving Japanese-Soviet relations through a Soviet troops withdrawal from Afghanistan and the return of the northern territories to Japan. In February, at the 26th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Brezhnev again expressed the desire to build "trust-enhancing relations" with Japan. Following this, the Soviet ambassador to Japan, Dmitri Polyansky, proposed talks with Suzuki. The Japanese side gave these Soviet overtures a very clear-cut answer. Prime Minister Suzuki reiterated several times that the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the Polish events had "aggravated the tense international situation" and asked the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and not to intervene in Poland. On March 11, at the meeting of the House of Councillors Budget Committee the Japanese Prime Minister said clearly: "In order to promote genuinely friendly relations of co-operation between Japan and the Soviet Union, the return of our inherent four northern islands must be solved and a peace and friendship treaty be concluded so as to normalize relations between the two countries." On March 15, when the Japanese Foreign Minister held talks with Polyansky, he stress-

ed, "To establish relations of mutual trust between Japan and the Soviet Union, the essential thing is to solve the territorial problem." He also declined arranging a meeting of the Soviet ambassador with Prime Minister Suzuki. Earlier, the Japanese Government had designated February 7 as "Northern Territories Day" and launched a drive among officials and citizens for the return of the northern territories. This month Suzuki is to inspect the northern territories for the first time in his official capacity as Prime Minister. The present posture of Japan is clearly an advance over that of Ohira.

### Three Visits

In the first half of this year Suzuki made three visits abroad. Nothing remarkable about that. But unlike all his postwar predecessors, this Japanese Prime Minister first visited the ASEAN countries, not the United States. It is an established practice after World War II that the first visit abroad of the incoming Japanese Prime Minister is paid to the United States. But Suzuki in January went off to Southeast Asia. It shows how much importance Japan attaches to Asia and Japan's new priorities in its foreign policy. In talks with the leaders of the ASEAN countries, Suzuki repeatedly stressed that "extensive co-operation" with ASEAN was the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy. He expressed support for ASEAN's stand on Kampuchea and asked Viet Nam to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea, thus extending relations between Japan and ASEAN from the economic field to the

political field. In his talks with Reagan last May Japan's relationship with the United States had developed from being a subordinate to the United States in the 50s-60s to becoming a partner in the 70s, into an unwritten but verbally agreed alliance and then into an alliance written into the Japanese-US joint communique. This development shows that the increasing threat posed by the Soviet Union and the decline of US might have brought Japan to play an increasingly important role in US global strategy.

Suzuki's June visit to Western Europe has changed Japan's long-standing practice of politically putting the United States first and neglecting Western Europe and exporting a lot and importing little from Western Europe. A new relationship has emerged between the Japanese-US alliance and the NATO alliance, and the tripartite relations between Japan, the United States and Western Europe have been strengthened as well as fortifying forces confronting the Soviet threat. Suzuki's proposal that everything possible should be done to prevent a Soviet military intervention in Poland was particularly well accepted by the heads of West European countries.

It is not accidental that the Suzuki cabinet gives so much attention to foreign affairs. It is related to Japan's own strength and the international issues it is faced with. Japan is threatened by the Soviet Union in many areas—the northern territories, Southeast Asia, the Strait of Malacca, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. Japan has to rely on the United States, unite with Western Europe and



use the third world to deal with the Soviet threat. At the same time it wants to use its economic might to back its bid for big-power political status. For Japan to become a big political power with the whole world threatened by the Soviet Union, it must play a big political role in dealing with the Soviet threat. After establishing the Japanese-US alliance, Suzuki briefed the heads of the ASEAN countries about the results of the Japanese-US summit and during his visit to Western Europe, he emphasized the setting up of the tripartite Japan-US-European relations. All these were done with the view to further co-ordinating strategy against the Soviet Union and allowing Japan to play a "lubricating role" in the relations between the United States and ASEAN as well as the United States and Western Europe and thus making these countries gradually acknowledge Japan as politically a big power.

### "The Year of Internal Affairs"

If the first year of the Suzuki cabinet was a "year of foreign affairs," then the next year will be a "year of internal affairs." Will the Suzuki cabinet sail smoothly through the next twelve months? From the political agenda for this half of the year, the future does not look too promising.

Suzuki has declared that he is staking his political life on introducing "administrative reforms" which will lower budget deficits without increasing taxes. Prime Minister Ohira had put forward a policy of increasing taxes and eliminating the budget deficit. It enraged voters in the 1979 elections and cut his votes down considerably. Zenko Suzuki's announcement

that he is going to streamline administration to lower the budget deficit has won him some public support at the moment. The proposal envisages: 1) cutting down subsidies to the various ministries of the government; 2) reducing expenditures on public utilities; 3) lowering expenditures on culture, education and welfare; 4) slashing government subsidies for rice; 5) reducing the number of government employees. The Japanese Prime Minister wants to call an extra session of the Diet in September to approve an "administration reform" bill and then reorganize in November the cabinet and the leading organs of the Liberal Democratic Party. Suzuki wants to win political kudos within the cabinet, bolster his position in the party to pave the way for his re-election as President of the Liberal Democratic Party in November.

But in the wake of Japan's high-speed development of its economy over the past 20 years, the government bureaucracy has grown enormously. Trimming the number of government employees is going to be easier said than done. It is like paring flesh off oneself! Already there is stiff resistance from all quarters. Many Liberal Democratic Party Diet members were elected by rural voters and they are against cutting rice subsidies. The Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries has warned that, if anything is done to hurt the farmers, a Socialist Party government could emerge in Japan as in France. The opposition parties are also against the bill. They charge that the Suzuki cabinet is cutting down spending on administration and social welfare while increasing defence spending. "This is transferring the burden of bal-

ancing out the financial deficit on to the citizens." The debate in the Diet in autumn over the "administration reform" bill will be a stormy test for the Suzuki cabinet.

Any tempest at the autumn Diet meeting will inevitably have repercussions on the reorganization of the cabinet and personnel changes inside the Liberal Democratic Party. The political situation in Japan at the end of May was already anything but quiet. The Japanese Government was divided over the interpretation of the Japan-US alliance and Masayoshi Ito, the Foreign Minister, was forced to resign. Suzuki was said to "lack competence" as a Prime Minister. Some members of the Liberal Democratic Party called for changing the Prime Minister. Only after three former Prime Ministers, Kakuei Tanaka, Takeo Fukuda and Miki Takeo, had issued statements in late June in the *Yomiuri Shimbun* defending the Suzuki cabinet did the storm abate. This shows that the Liberal Democratic Party is unwilling to see its present political superiority weakened in any way. It will do what it can to ensure the life of the Suzuki cabinet, and if possible get him re-elected next winter and allow his cabinet to run until 1984. By that time, a new President of the LDP and successor to the post of Prime Minister will be groomed.

But if the "administration reform" fails, the political situation is sure to become destabilized and the outlook for the Suzuki cabinet will not be very bright. The next 12 months will be a "crucial year" for the Suzuki cabinet.

— Wu Xuewen



*On the Party Resolution*

# The Causes of the "Cultural Revolution"

by Zhu Yuanshi

**I**N May 1966, Comrade Mao Zedong launched the "cultural revolution" which swept across the whole country. As a result of his mistaken estimation of China's class situation and the political condition of the Party and the state at that time, many long-tested, loyal revolutionaries of the older generation and numerous excellent leading Party cadres suffered ruthless attacks. Two counter-revolutionary cliques (Lin Biao's and Jiang Qing's) emerged during the "cultural revolution." Taking advantage of Comrade Mao Zedong's errors, they committed many crimes unbeknownst to him, bringing disaster to the country and the people. The "cultural revolution" which he initiated became uncontrollable like an unbridled wild horse. Due to various complex reasons, it was not possible to check this tumult during Comrade Mao Zedong's lifetime. Only after the downfall of the gang of four in October 1976 and the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Party in December 1978, did the Party and the state enter a new historical period of development.

Then, can it be said that the "cultural revolution" was caused only by a mistake of Comrade Mao Zedong? No, the coming into being of each social phenomenon has its own dynamic. The main causes for the emergence of the "cultural revolution" and its protraction for ten years are:

## 1. Comrade Mao Zedong's mistake in leadership is the immediate cause.

After the basic completion of socialist transformation and as a result of the implementation of the correct line of the Party's Eighth National Congress (see page 19) in 1956 to concentrate efforts on developing the productive forces, 1957 was one of the best years since the founding of the People's Republic in terms of economic work. Unfortunately, Comrade Mao Zedong had become smug about the successes; he and many other leading comrades, both at the centre and in the localities, overestimated the role of man's subjective will and

were impatient for quick results. Thus the big leap forward (see page 19) and the movement to establish rural people's communes (see page 20) were initiated in 1958 without sufficient experience in large-scale socialist construction and in violation of the basic law of economic development. "Left" errors — characterized by excessive targets, the issuing of arbitrary directives, boastfulness and the stirring up of a "communist wind" — spread throughout the country, causing serious setbacks to socialist construction. From the end of 1958 through the early stage of the Lushan Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Party's Central Committee in July 1959, Comrade Mao Zedong led the whole Party in energetically rectifying the errors which had already been recognized. However, in the later part of the meeting, Comrade Peng Dehuai voiced his objections to the "Left" errors of the big leap forward and Comrade Mao Zedong deemed this as an attack on the Party. He erred in initiating criticism of Comrade Peng Dehuai, which developed into a Party-wide struggle against "Right opportunism." As a result, not only were the "Left" errors in the principles guiding economic work not eradicated, but they gradually infected the political, ideological and cultural spheres.

Comrade Mao Zedong's view of widening and absolutizing the class struggle developed gradually. In 1959, he said: "The struggle at Lushan is a class struggle, a continuation of the life-and-death struggle between the two major antagonistic classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, a struggle which has been going on in the socialist revolution for the last 10 years." In 1962, he often expounded the view that in socialist society, "there is the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road, and there is the danger of capitalist restoration." In 1965, he put forward the concept of Party persons in power taking the capitalist road. Henceforth, the spearhead of struggle was clearly directed against such persons in the Party.



In the May 16 Circular (see page 20), which marked the launching of the "cultural revolution," Comrade Mao Zedong severely criticized the so-called representatives of the bourgeoisie who had sneaked into the Party, the government, the army and the cultural circles. It seemed to him that this was a major matter which affected the future of the Party and state and the destiny of the world revolution, a matter which could not be left unresolved. Unfortunately, his analysis was like that of a devoted doctor who has made an incorrect diagnosis and thus written a wrong prescription.

Our Party concurred with every step in the development of this erroneous "Left" viewpoint, regarded it as Comrade Mao Zedong's new creative theory in furthering Marxism-Leninism and propagated it widely. Thus with this "Leftist" thinking so deep-rooted, the launching of the "cultural revolution" was hard to resist.

**2. In addition to Comrade Mao Zedong's mistake in leadership, there are complex social and historical causes underlying the "cultural revolution."**

1) The history of the international communist movement is not long and that of the socialist countries even shorter. Some of the laws governing the development of socialist society are relatively clear, but many others remain to be explored.

Marx and Engels only prophesied the coming of communist society and its initial stage. Apart from the Paris Commune which existed for only 72 days, they had not seen or experienced socialism. Therefore, their great ideal could only be a general concept which pointed out the trend of scientific communism: it could not be very specific.

Lenin had more experience. But those years just after the establishment of the Soviet political power were chaotic; there was resistance from the bourgeoisie, adverse activities against the Soviet by the kulaks and attacks by the domestic counter-revolutionary cliques like Kolchak and Denikin and by 14 capitalist countries. In these years, the Soviet Union suffered civil war, famine and economic difficulties. Although Lenin had much understanding of socialist construction, there was little time and it was impossible for him to scientifically summarize their experiences in large-scale socialist construction. In his *Theses on the Fundamental Tasks of the Second Congress of the*

*Communist International* published in July 1920, Lenin stressed that the class struggle against the bourgeoisie after the proletariat's conquest of political power was "most widespread, intense and ruthless." He not only thought that the resistance of the overthrown landlords and the bourgeoisie would become 10 times more frenzied and that there was the danger of restoration, but he also deemed the numerous small producers as the basis for restoration. This thesis which Lenin put forward in light of the Soviet situation at that time was not appropriate for China's conditions after 1957 when socialist transformation had basically been completed. But it had a great influence on us.

Inheriting Lenin's behest, Stalin led the socialist construction in the Soviet Union. But he, too, did not and could not provide ready-made answers to all the problems that would crop up in the socialist cause. Moreover, he vacillated in his assessment of the class struggle in the period of socialism, and finally he came to the conclusion that class struggle became acuter day by day. Furthermore, he forced his opinions onto others in the international communist movement and simplified the question that each socialist country is to develop socialism in the light of its own concrete situation.

2) The Chinese Communist Party had long existed in circumstances of war and fierce class struggle. It was not adequately prepared, either ideologically or in terms of scientific study, for the swift advent of the new-born socialist society and for nationwide socialist construction. We lacked experience in handling extensive socialist economic construction and in dealing with the various political contradictions in socialist society. These historical features of our Party determined, to a large extent, our habitual falling back on the familiar methods and experiences of large-scale, turbulent class struggle used in the years of war. They should no longer have been followed in solving new contradictions and problems that cropped up in the political, economic, cultural and other spheres in the course of the development of socialist society, especially when some serious social, political events had occurred. As a result, we broadened the scope of class struggle.

3) This subjective thinking and practice which was divorced from reality seemed to have a "theoretical basis" in the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin because certain



ideas and arguments in them were misunderstood or dogmatically interpreted.

For instance, it was thought that equal right, which reflects the exchange of equal amounts of labour and is applicable to the distribution of the means of consumption in socialist society, or "bourgeois right" as it was designated by Marx, should be restricted and criticized, and so the principles of "to each according to his work" and of material interest should be restricted and criticized. Actually, in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, what Marx called equal right was abstracted from the economic relation of "to each according to his work," or from the common characteristics of exchange of commodities of equal value, that is, exchange of equal amounts of labour, which is embodied in the equal rights of the two exchangers. Equal right does not have any capitalist exploitative nature. Marx's idea of the first stage of communist society did not include commodity production, a monetary system or any classes. The "bourgeois right" in his book has nothing to do with the right of the bourgeoisie or any other exploiters. The term "bourgeois" here is not used in its original meaning. In *The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution*, Lenin explained: "From capitalism mankind can pass directly only to socialism, i.e., to the social ownership of the means of production and the distribution of products according to the amount of work performed by each individual." This clearly confirms that the principle of "to each according to his work" and the public ownership of the means of production are the criteria for socialism.

Other passages that were misunderstood or dogmatically interpreted included: Small production will continue to engender capitalism and the bourgeoisie daily and hourly on a large scale even after the basic completion of socialist transformation; all ideological differences inside the Party are reflections of class struggle in society. All this led us to erroneously regard the broadening of the scope of class struggle as an action taken in defence of the purity of Marxism.

4) The chaotic international environment and the failure to correctly understand the new problems arising in the international communist movement hindered us from correctly understanding the class struggle. In dealing with the relations between China and the Soviet Union and between the two Parties, the Soviet leaders headed by Khrushchov deviated further

and further from the Marxist-Leninist principles. They regarded themselves as the paternal party, replaced internationalism with big-nation chauvinism and hegemonism, and flagrantly tried to control China politically, economically and militarily. Having been rebuffed by Comrade Mao Zedong, Khrushchov flew into a rage from shame and went even further. The Soviet leaders started a polemic between China and the Soviet Union and turned the arguments between the two Parties on matters of principle into a conflict between the two countries. When we were faced with difficulties resulting from our errors in economic work and consecutive years of natural disasters, the Soviet government perfidiously tore up contracts, withdrew Soviet experts and forced us to pay back the debts (debts incurred mainly through purchasing Soviet arms during the movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea). This caused enormous economic losses and intensified the severity of our difficulties. All these activities of the Soviet leaders forced us to wage a just struggle against the big-nation chauvinism of the Soviet Union. In these circumstances we were susceptible to Comrade Mao Zedong's erroneous viewpoint. In order to guard against a change of political colour of the Party and the state, a campaign to prevent and combat revisionism inside the country was launched. The error of broadening the scope of class struggle spread step by step in our Party. It was difficult for us to fully discuss many problems. Normal differences among comrades inside the Party and small errors came to be regarded as manifestations of the class struggle inside the Party, as matters of life and death. This led to the thinking that there were those in the leading core of our Party who like Khrushchov flaunted a red flag to oppose the red flag, that there was a revisionist political line inside the Party and an organizational line which served this political line and that there was a bourgeois headquarters in the Central Committee and its agents in the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions. Under such circumstances it seemed only logical that to solve this serious nationwide question, it is not enough to just rely on normal criticism and self-criticism inside the Party. So, Comrade Mao Zedong used his prestige earned over long years to ignite a mass movement by openly and fully mobilizing the broad masses from the bottom up. This was in essence a violent struggle in which one class would overthrow another. He even thought



that this type of "revolution" would have to be waged time and again.

3. The principles of collective leadership in the political life of the Party and the state and of democratic centralism were seriously weakened and even undermined; this is another key reason why the "cultural revolution" could be launched by Comrade Mao Zedong single-handedly and last a whole decade. The social and historical causes include:

1) At the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the Party's collective leadership and democratic centralism were underscored; and exaggeration of a single person's role, deification of the leaders and the personality cult were opposed. Nevertheless, the relevant rules and regulations adopted at that time failed to be implemented. The leading position of Comrade Mao Zedong in the Party Central Committee had been recognized ever since the Zunyi Meeting in 1935. The continuous victories of the Chinese revolution earned him unparalleled prestige, but with this came excessive extolling from the Party and the people of all nationalities. Some even credited him with all the victories of the Chinese revolution; propaganda that placed him well above the Party and the people increased day by day. Comrade Mao Zedong, on his part, grew conceited. He no longer treated his comrades as equals, and it became harder to discuss and make decisions with him in a democratic way. Such abnormality in the inner-Party life and, first of all, in the political life of the Party central leading organ grew so serious that on the eve of the "cultural revolution" the Party Central Committee was unable to restrain Comrade Mao Zedong at all. Shortly after the "cultural revolution" began, many Members of the Political Bureau expressed disagreement with its methods, only to be accused of whipping up the "February adverse current." (See page 21.) Later on, the "cultural revolution group," set up upon a decision of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee as a working organ under its Standing Committee, actually usurped the power of the Political Bureau. With the Party's democratic centralism so crippled it is not surprising that no one could prevent the "cultural revolution" from running its course.

2) Leaders play quite an important role in the communist movement. But, owing to the failure to handle the relationship between the Party and its leader correctly, there occurred certain grievous deviations in the history of the

international communist movement. Comrade Stalin, at a time when his reputation was at its pinnacle at home and abroad, exaggerated his own role and placed his own power in a position antagonistic to the collective leadership and democratic centralism. During his later years, he enjoyed, accepted and encouraged the personality cult; and he made decisions arbitrarily. Further, the Third International under his leadership after Lenin's death instituted a system in which power was over-concentrated. All this has had a negative influence on our Party.

3) That arbitrary individual rule and the personality cult found fertile soil here is because China had been an autocratic, feudal country for thousands of years. Autocracy in China has a historical tradition and a social basis. The new-democratic revolution led by our Party completely freed China from the feudal economic and political systems. However, because we focused our attention on the decisive role of the transformation of the economic system, we overlooked the role tradition plays in the people's thinking and failed to systematically criticize and repudiate the ideological influences of feudal autocracy that were still prevalent in the political and social life. As a result, remnants of such ideology and traditional practices as the personality cult, patriarchy, privilege, and hierarchy found their way into our Party. In addition, we had for a considerable period of time failed to amply understand the importance of the establishment of a sound people's democratic political system, and to enact a sound socialist constitution, laws and legal system. We abandoned some correct political and legal concepts and in this way provided hotbeds for the remnants of feudal autocracy to grow in our political life. All this provided favourable conditions for the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques to whip up the personality cult to serve their own schemes. Even a great Marxist like Comrade Mao Zedong could not avoid being influenced. Any word from Comrade Mao Zedong became a "supreme directive," the criterion for testing the truth, and sometimes even the unchallengeable law. Without such a political environment, the launching and continuation of the "cultural revolution" would have been impossible.

Experience is the best teacher. We must draw lessons from the "cultural revolution," and thus we will be able to make up for lost time. □



## On Certain Historical Events

*In the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China" (see issue No. 27) and the "Beijing Review" explanatory articles on it, a number of historical events were mentioned. To give our readers some insight into these events, we will begin from this issue, publish relevant reference materials. — Ed.*

### The Party's Eighth National Congress

This congress was convened in Beijing between September 15 and 27, 1956, after the socialist system had basically been set up in China. The purpose of the meeting was to sum up the experiences gained after the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1945, especially the experiences of the socialist revolution and socialist construction, so as to unite the whole Party and all the forces that could be united for building a great socialist China. At the congress, Comrade Mao Zedong delivered the opening speech, Comrade Liu Shaoqi gave a political report, Comrade Deng Xiaoping made a report on revising the Party constitution, Comrade Zhou Enlai reported on the proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan to develop the national economy, and Comrades Zhu De and Chen Yun also delivered important speeches.

In accordance with the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, the congress made a scientific analysis of the situation of the time and pointed out that with the establishment of the socialist system in the main, the principal contradiction at home was no longer between the working class and the bourgeoisie but between the people's demand for a rapid economic and cultural development and the situation in which the development of economy and culture fell behind people's demand. The major task for people across the land, therefore, was to concentrate their efforts on developing the productive forces.

The congress emphasized that efforts to build the Party in power should be stepped up, democratic centralism and the system of collective leadership should be upheld and the personality cult should be opposed. It summed up

the achievements and experiences of China's socialist construction, underscored the importance of working out an appropriate rate of growth for the national economy so that the various economic branches could grow in a proportionate way, and drafted the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-62) for developing the national economy. The line of the Party's Eighth National Congress was correct: it pointed out the direction for the Chinese people on their road forward. However, the policies and principles laid down at the congress were not implemented.

### "Big Leap Forward"

At the time of the "big leap forward of the national economy," China had just effected the socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of production and had engaged in construction projects in line with the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57). Significant victories in the socialist revolution and construction had been achieved. Under these circumstances, Comrade Mao Zedong and a number of other leading comrades both at the centre and in the localities became smug about the successes and were impatient for quick results.

This tendency was reflected in the call of the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress held in May 1958 to catch up with and surpass Britain in the output of major industrial products within 15 years. The Beidaihe Conference held in August 1958 made a wrong assessment of the situation and propagated the idea that a big leap had occurred in grain production and this would be quickly followed by a jump in industrial production. As a major step for the 1958 "big leap forward," the conference called the nation to double the 1957 steel output of 5.35 million tons in the year.

To accomplish this, the principle of "taking steel as the key link" was put forward. People in their millions were mobilized in the drive to boost steel production. The state investment in capital construction nearly doubled, 20 million more workers and staff members were employed, and the rate of accumulation went up to 33.9 per cent. The production plan was persistently held to even when it became clear in



October that the target for steel output could not possibly be met. As a result, people were inclined to cheat and exaggerate, a tendency which spread through various localities.

The "big leap forward" initially began in order to build socialism rapidly and thereby change the poor and backward state of China as soon as possible. However, due to inadequate understanding of the laws of economic development and of the basic situation in the national economy and to the overestimation of the role of man's subjective will and efforts, "Left" errors held sway throughout the nation. These "Left" errors were characterized by the tendencies to set unattainably high production quotas, order people about arbitrarily, exaggerate work done and stir up a "communist wind." The consequences were quite serious: the various branches of the national economy developed in a disproportionate way, production slumped and the nation and the people suffered serious losses.

## Movement to Set Up People's Communes

Between winter 1957 and spring 1958, large-scale farmland capital construction work was undertaken in various parts of the country. In some places agricultural co-operatives got together to build reservoirs, afforest the land and combat drought. This prompted a number of people to think that merging the small co-operatives to form larger ones would provide more resources to take on larger projects.

The adoption of the document *On Appropriately Merging Small Co-ops Into Bigger Ones* at the Party's Chengdu Meeting in March 1958 sparked off a movement in some areas in Henan Province to set up larger co-operatives. In some places people's communes were set up.

On August 6, Comrade Mao Zedong inspected the Qiliying People's Commune in Henan and some days later toured the countryside in Shandong Province. He announced that it was fine to set up people's communes, and the newspapers told the whole country about this.

The Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee held in Beidaihe on August 29 affirmed the setting up of people's communes as fine for the following reasons: they were larger, had a more pronounced socialist nature and were the best form

for realizing the transition to communism. The meeting adopted a resolution on establishing people's communes in the rural areas. Within two months and without first making investigations and trials, people's communes were set up throughout the countryside. The 740,000 agricultural co-operatives were merged into 26,000 people's communes.

The drive to set up people's communes, which did not take into account the level of development of the productive forces, had as its goal the upgrading of the level of public ownership of means of production. It abandoned the system of responsibility being popularized and was proving quite effective. Hence, equalitarianism and indiscriminate requisitioning of materials and manpower became widespread in the countryside. These things hurt enormously the economic interests of the peasants and gravely damaged the rural economy.

The Party Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong discovered these mistakes in good time and in November 1958 began to rectify them step by step. In 1961, the Party Central Committee explicitly declared that within a people's commune there should be three levels of ownership — ownership of the commune, the production brigade and the production team — with the production team as the basic accounting unit.

## May 16 Circular

The May 16 Circular of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was adopted by an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee in May 1966. It was written under Comrade Mao Zedong's personal guidance and was the programmatic document for the nationwide "cultural revolution."

The May 16 Circular contained a totally wrong appraisal of the situation of class struggle in the country and of the political conditions within the Party. It completely muddled the distinction between the people and the enemy, directed the spearhead of struggle at the "capitalist-roaders" and "reactionary academic authorities," and regarded the broad masses of cadres and intellectuals as the objects of revolution, practising "dictatorship" over the "superstructure" and the "various cultural spheres." The implementation of the May 16 Circular caused very serious consequences.



## "February Adverse Current"

This was a heroic struggle waged by the older generation of revolutionaries to save the future of the Party and state and to defend the revolution and the Party at a critical moment of the "cultural revolution."

Around February 1967, Tan Zhenlin, Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen of the Political Bureau and Military Commission raised strong criticism at the erroneous tendencies of the "cultural revolution" at some meetings, including those presided over by Zhou Enlai of comrades responsible for the routine work of the Party, the government and the army and members of the "cultural revolution group under the Central Committee." They repudiated those careerists and schemists who had gained control of the "cultural revolution group," made trouble in the Party, the government, factories and the rural areas and tried to undermine the army —

the pillar of the proletarian dictatorship. They exposed their ultra-Left nature and their attempts to overthrow all the veteran cadres and usurp Party and state leadership. The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques branded this the "February adverse current" and took advantage of Comrade Mao Zedong's criticisms of some responsible members to launch a nationwide counter-attack against the "February adverse current." Almost all the leading bodies of the departments of the central government and those of the Party and governments at various levels were brushed aside or reorganized.

It is true that Comrade Mao Zedong was responsible for the criticism of the "February adverse current." However, after the downfall of the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary clique in 1971, Comrade Mao Zedong made some efforts to rectify his mistake. He said: Since this event has been clarified, we shouldn't talk about the "February adverse current" any more. □

## China-USSR

# The Disputed Area of the Pamirs

**The question over the boundary in the Pamirs between China and the Soviet Union was created by tsarist Russian aggression against China and remains one of the major outstanding issues left over from history. The Soviet Union has issued a statement distorting and falsifying history to defend its illegal occupation. This is typical of hegemonists.**

CHINESE Foreign Ministry sources speaking to Xinhua News Agency correspondents on August 31 refuted the statement issued by the Soviet Foreign Ministry which distorted and falsified the history concerning the disputed area of the Chinese-Soviet frontier in the Pamirs.

In a statement on August 11, 1981, countering a statement by the spokesman of the Department of Information of the Chinese Foreign Ministry on July 22, 1981, the Soviet Foreign Ministry declared that the Chinese claim concerning the disputed area of the Chinese-Soviet frontier in the Pamirs was "unfounded." It alleged that the boundary in the Pamirs "was established historically" and "was formalized through an exchange of notes in 1894." It added that "on Chinese maps the frontier in that section is delineated in the same way as on Soviet maps, i.e., by the Sarykol Range." Xinhua correspondents calling on the Chinese Foreign

Ministry about this matter heard an official point this out:


To defend tsarist Russia's and the Soviet Union's illegal occupation of territory in the Pamirs belonging to China, the Soviet Foreign Ministry in its statement turned facts upside down and fabricated "facts."

Historically, the Pamirs belonged to China. In the past, successive Chinese governments had dispatched officials and troops there to exercise effective jurisdiction. This historical fact is recorded not only in a large number of Chinese official documents but is also stated in explicit terms in many works and maps of tsarist Russia and also of the Soviet Union. It was not until the signing of the Sino-Russian Kashgar Boundary Treaty by China and Russia in 1884, which stipulated that "Russia's boundary turns southwest while the Chinese boundary extends straight south" from the Uzbek Pass, that large tracts of territory in the Chinese Pamirs were annexed by tsarist Russia.

Although the Sino-Russian Kashgar Boundary Treaty (1884) was signed by the Chinese Qing Government under tsarist Russian duress, the treaty remains the only valid boundary treaty determining the alignment of the Chinese and Soviet frontiers in the Pamirs. The



# SKETCH MAP OF THE DISPUTED SINO-SOVIET AREA IN THE PAMIRS



Soviet Foreign Ministry statement today deliberately avoids mentioning this clear stipulation concerning the alignment of the boundary line in this area set down in the Sino-Russian Kashgar Boundary Treaty of 1884 as if the boundary treaty had nothing to do with the sovereignty of the Pamirs and that only the notes exchanged between China and Russia in 1894 are documents delineating the boundary in this area.

What are these notes exchanged in 1894?

In 1892, in violation of the 1884 boundary treaty, tsarist Russian imperialism ordered troops to the Pamirs and occupied a further area totalling more than 20,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory west of the Sarykol Range. The Chinese Government of the Qing Dynasty lodged a protest with the Russian Government against this naked act of aggression and sent its representative for talks with the Russian side. The Chinese side demanded that the boundary in the Pamirs between the two countries must be surveyed and delineated according to the 1884 Sino-Russian Kashgar Boundary Treaty. However, the Russian side, resorting to procrastination, evasion and blackmail, rejected the legitimate demand of the Chinese Government. In 1894, the Chinese and Russian sides exchanged notes on this issue of the Pamirs (hereafter as Notes Exchanged in 1894). On April 12 the same year, the Russian Foreign Minister in a note to the Chinese Charge d'Affaires to St. Petersburg proposed that, "in view of the fact that divergences of views exist between Russia and China over the question of the Pamirs and that it is impossible to arrive at an understanding immediately," the Imperial Government of Rus-

sia believes that the "best method" to avoid any misunderstanding or possible clashes was for the troops of both sides to remain where they are at the moment and to maintain the status quo. On April 23, the same Russian Foreign Minister said in a note: "Orders have been issued to the competent Russian authorities not to go beyond the positions they now hold before an ultimate settlement is reached by Russia and China on the question of demarcating the boundary in the Pamirs."

The Chinese note of April 17, 1894, solemnly proclaimed: "Taking the above-stated meas-

ures does not mean the relinquishment of China's right to the Pamirs territory presently not under the control of the Chinese forces. It [the Chinese Government] considers it necessary to maintain its rights based on the 1884 boundary treaty until a satisfactory understanding is reached"; "taking the above-stated measures does not mean the cessation of the present negotiations either." This is the "exchange of notes in 1894" referred to in the Soviet Foreign Ministry's statement and about the boundary in the Pamirs "established historically" as alleged by the Soviet side.

The notes exchanged in 1894, therefore, are not documents governing the demarcation of the boundary, but are documents exchanged between the aggressor and the victim of aggression, in which each stated its own position. The contents of the notes confirm the existence of the Sino-Russian territorial dispute in the Pamirs. They prove that the dispute remains unsettled and that both sides agreed to maintain the status quo for the time being. The Chinese Government of the Qing Dynasty stated that it reserved China's right to the Pamirs territory under the 1884 boundary treaty and that it did not in any way recognize tsarist Russia's line of military occupation in the Pamirs. The Russian side recognized the existence of the dispute between the two countries over the Pamirs and agreed to leave the demarcation of the boundary in the Pamirs for later. Now, the Soviet Union has unwarrantedly invoked the notes exchanged in 1894 as documents on the demarcation of the boundary to show the "legality" of the Soviet Union's occupation of that



area. This shows that the Soviet authorities today have taken over and even improved on the big-nation chauvinism and expansionist ambitions of tsarist Russian imperialism.

The successive Chinese Governments and the Soviet Government in the early years of the revolution recognized the fact that the Sino-Russian dispute over their boundary in the Pamirs was yet to be settled.

For instance, the Chinese side in an aide-memoire to the Soviet side on March 25, 1926, pointed out that the Pamirs was Chinese territory, which the Imperial Russian Government had sent troops to forcibly occupy on the pretext of borrowing the area, and was still an outstanding issue. On April 14 the same year, the Soviet side in an aide-memoire to the Chinese side declared that "even the area where the boundary has never been demarcated had to be redemarcated." "The area where the boundary has never been demarcated" which the Soviet Government referred to is the Pamirs. The Soviet authorities' assertion today that the Sino-Soviet frontier in the area of the Pamirs has been delineated shows clearly their flagrant disregard for historical facts.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry has alleged that on the Chinese maps the frontier in the section in question is delineated in the same way as on the Soviet maps. This is deliberate misrepresentation.

It should be noted that the maps of China now published here are based on the ones published before liberation. The boundary line in the Pamirs is delineated with the sign of undemarcated frontier, indicating that the boundary

dispute there is yet to be settled. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, unilaterally delineated the boundary as demarcated frontier. Therefore, the delineations of the boundary are totally different on the Chinese and Soviet maps.

When the Chinese and Soviet Governments exchanged maps during the Sino-Soviet boundary negotiations in 1964, the map the Chinese Government handed to the Soviet side was made faithfully according to the stipulations in the 1884 Sino-Russian Kashgar Boundary Treaty, while the map the Soviet side handed to the Chinese side showed a different delineation.

The disputed area of the Chinese-Soviet frontier in the Pamirs is the result of tsarist Russia's aggression against China and one of the major outstanding issues left over from history; it is not trumped up by the Chinese side. The Chinese Government has always stood for a settlement of the dispute by the peaceful means of negotiation on an equal footing. But the Soviet authorities have not only concluded a boundary alignment treaty with a third country which involves the disputed area of the Chinese-Soviet frontier in the region and, what is worse, by resorting to misrepresentation, denial and inventing historical facts, slandered China as harbouring "great-power desire" and making "unfounded" territorial claims. This is typical of hegemonists. The Chinese side firmly adheres to its legitimate stand on the outstanding Sino-Soviet issue over the disputed area of the Chinese-Soviet frontier in the Pamirs. Whatever the Soviet authorities may do, they cannot deny that this issue arose as a result of tsarist Russia's aggression. □

## On the US "Taiwan Relations Act"

by Zhuang Qubing, Zhang Hongzeng and Pan Tongwen

*This is the second and concluding part of an article carried in the quarterly "Journal of International Studies," issue No. 1, 1981. The first part appeared in our last issue. — Ed.*

### III. To Develop Sino-US Relations, Obstructions Imposed by the "Taiwan Relations Act" Must Be Cleared Away.

SINCE President Nixon's 1972 visit to China and the establishment of Sino-US diplomatic relations in 1979, a number of Americans in power have tried to maintain control over Taiwan even as they sought to improve relations

with China. To this end, they have racked their brains to think up various schemes, but after all their plans failed, they tried to turn Taiwan into a certain "independent political entity" to obtain "international status." This is just another version of the old "one China, one Taiwan" plot. The "Taiwan Relations Act" is the embodiment of such a line of thinking. But to develop relations with China and to maintain control over Taiwan constitute an irreconcilable contradiction. One can't have the cake and eat it. Taiwan was the crucial issue obstructing normalization of relations between China and the United States for a long time.



Only after the United States accepted the three principles for establishing Sino-US diplomatic relations which China has always advocated, recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government and Taiwan as an integral part of China, was the agreement on the establishment of Sino-US diplomatic relations reached. By rights the publication of the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and the United States should have solved the Taiwan issue between China and the United States. However, the adoption of the "Taiwan Relations Act" by the US Congress has again made the Taiwan issue a major obstacle to the development of Sino-American relations. The sharp and complex struggle between China and the United States over the issue of Taiwan in the past 30 years or more should suffice to fully demonstrate that the Chinese people stand firm and resolve to reunify their country and safeguard its territorial integrity. If the United States stubbornly adheres to the "Taiwan Relations Act" in its actions, then normal relations between China and the United States, established only after long and painstaking efforts by the two countries, will certainly be gravely impaired.

During discussion on the "Taiwan Relations Act," many who favoured a provision on "maintaining the security of Taiwan" claimed they were only "concerned with the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem." In fact, what they were proposing would obstruct the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem. Everyone knows what efforts the Chinese people have made for the return of Taiwan to the motherland in a peaceful way. But, the provisions in the "Taiwan Relations Act" interfering in the internal affairs of China only encourage the Taiwan authorities to reject peace talks and a peaceful reunification.

Some top-echelon Americans still cling to the time-worn view that, so long as the United States counters Soviet expansionism, China will not quibble over the issue of Taiwan. This shows they have an incorrect concept of the foundation on which Sino-US relations should be established, a concept not in conformity with objective developments. When the Sino-US joint communiqué was signed in Shanghai in 1972, the two sides agreed that the relationship between countries "will be based on the princi-

ples of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence," and that they "are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations." The two sides also announced: "Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony." These two provisions constitute the principled basis of Sino-US relations and neither must be overlooked. This was precisely embodied in the joint communiqué on the establishment of Sino-US diplomatic relations in 1979. In the Sino-US joint communiqué, the United States recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and Taiwan a part of it; at the same time, both sides reiterated the anti-hegemonist stipulation in the "Shanghai communiqué." Under such circumstances, isn't it a retrogression for someone to believe that Sino-US relations can rest solely on opposition to another country's hegemonist acts? It is sheer fantasy to think that China will agree to such a retrogression.

In the United States there are still some people who blatantly propose "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." They absurdly say that as China has to rely on the United States to cope with the Soviet threat and that China needs US assistance to realize its four modernizations, China will simply have to swallow the "bitter pill" of the Taiwan issue if the United States adopts a tougher attitude. It is an extremely erroneous estimation arising from complete ignorance of history and reality.

To oppose Soviet hegemonism is in the interest of China and the United States as well as in the interest of world peace. China is poor and militarily relatively backward, but its position and role in the struggle against Soviet hegemonism and its capability to withstand severe external tests should not be underestimated. The United States looks upon itself as the most prosperous and powerful country in the world. But Secretary of State Haig has put it aptly. The Soviet military machine, he said, has now acquired a global offensive capability to back up Moscow's pursuit of its imperialist foreign policy. The United States by itself is unable to meet this Soviet challenge. It must be dealt with by a collective force.<sup>16</sup> For this reason, Haig emphasized that to improve the relations between the United States and China



"is a fundamental strategic reality and a strategic imperative. It is of overriding importance to international stability and world peace."<sup>17</sup> Speaking of Sino-US relations, the Defence Secretary of the Carter administration Harold Brown also admitted that China's policy of resistance to the Soviet Union has brought tremendous strategic benefit to the United States.<sup>18</sup> It is ridiculous to claim that China needs the United States more than United States needs China in coping with the Soviet menace.

It is true that in bringing about the four modernizations, China wishes to upgrade economic co-operation with the United States and other industrialized countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. But China has relied and will continue to rely mainly on its own efforts in its socialist construction.

In the late 50s and the early 60s, the Soviet Union held the preposterous idea that China needed the Soviet Union to cope with the United States and provide it with "assistance" for construction. It was thus led to the belief that if the Soviet Union was tougher with China, China would swallow all of Moscow's unreasonable acts. It took advantage of an extremely difficult phase in China's economy to put pressure on China by tearing up contracts, withdrawing its specialists and forcing China to pay all its debts ahead of schedule. What happened? The Chinese people unfurled the banner of opposing Soviet hegemonism and waged an indomitable struggle, showing the world that the Chinese people are not to be bullied. This period of history should be a salutary lesson for those who have mistaken ideas on Sino-US relations. Giving his opinion on the "Taiwan Relations Act" before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, one US expert on China also referred to this episode in Sino-Soviet relations. "I think it is a very wrong and dangerous assumption to think that we do not have to take into account Peking's pride and Peking's position and past history,"<sup>19</sup> he pointed out.

While admitting there are flaws in the "Taiwan Relations Act," some people in US ruling circles still insist that the US Government must abide by an act passed by Congress. This raises the question of the relationship between the domestic law of a country and international obligations it has undertaken. Everybody knows that the "Taiwan Relations Act" is a domestic law of the United States. It should not in any way stand above any agreements reached by

the United States with other countries or any universally accepted international practice. Nor should it be used to govern relations between the United States and other countries. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that "a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty." Let it be noted that the United States is a signatory to this convention.

When the "Taiwan Relations Act" was discussed before the US Congress, the Chinese Government reminded the US Government that, in many respects, the text of the act to be put to the vote at that time violated the principles agreed upon by both sides for the establishment of diplomatic relations and the commitments undertaken by the American side. Therefore, the act would be very detrimental to the new relationship just established between the two countries. After the act was adopted, the Chinese Government again warned the US Government that if the US side did not observe the agreement on the Taiwan problem reached by both sides when diplomatic relations were established, it could only bring harm to Sino-US relations and good to neither side. The Chinese Government also expressed the hope that the US Government would bear the overall situation of Sino-US relations in mind and strictly observe the principles laid down in the agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Sino-US relations have traversed a long and tortuous road and are now at another crucial moment. Will it continue to advance in the direction as charted in the Sino-US joint communique, or retrogress because of the "Taiwan Relations Act"? It remains to be seen whether the policy-makers of the United States will correctly sum up historical experiences and draw lessons therefrom, soberly evaluate the whole situation in the international struggle and free themselves from the interference of the "Taiwan Relations Act." □

#### Notes

16. Haig's testimony before US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jan. 9, 1981.

17. *Time*, March 16, 1981.

18. *Taiwan: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*, 1979, p. 31.

19. *Ibid.* p. 609.



## Establishing Economic Centres

CENTRAL cities should be turned into economic centres in the future economic structure, replacing the existing system of provincial administration. The country is now divided into provinces, and industry in each area has to develop within this framework. Such a system does not conform to the demands of socialized mass production.

Historically, Shanghai served as the major economic centre of China. Other areas also had their own economic centres in the past; Tianjin functioned as a centre for north China and Guangzhou for south China. These centres maintained links with one another, forming a nationwide economic network.

In the future, Shanghai and other big cities should invest in such projects as running joint enterprises with the provinces and establish trans-provincial companies. Each province can also set up production or supply and marketing organizations in other provinces. Some people have worried that such steps

would widen the gap between the developed areas and the rest of the country. On the contrary, the opposite would occur. Such actions would diminish the differences and help the economic construction of the economically backward areas by supplying them with manpower and material and financial resources from the economically developed areas.

At present, there is little room for development in Shanghai and its efforts should be geared to helping the rural areas and other provinces. If the areas in China's southwest and northwest are encouraged to develop their production of raw materials and engage in the rough processing of agricultural, animal husbandry and forestry products with the support of economically developed areas, then they can develop their own industries faster.

(Excerpts from "Qiyue Guanli" [Enterprise Management], No. 3, 1981.)

## Sun Yat-sen's Abdication Reassessed

THE Revolution of 1911 ended with the downfall of the Qing Dynasty and the founding of the first bourgeois republic in China's history. Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) was sworn in as the republic's first provisional president. But before long, he abdicated in favour of a reactionary warlord, Yuan Shikai (1859-1916).

In the past when this event was analysed, the majority of researchers came to the same conclusion: this was the biggest mistake of Sun Yat-sen's career. This conclusion should be reconsidered.

Given the historical conditions of the time, Sun Yat-sen's abdication was unavoidable and it is not fair to hold him solely

responsible. Whether a bourgeois revolution can achieve its end and overthrow the feudal autocracy depends on two factors: the strength of the bourgeoisie and the maturity of the party representing it on the one hand, and the strength of the reactionary forces of the landlord class and its allies on the other. The balance of power at the onset of the Revolution of 1911 was tilted against the bourgeoisie, which was so weak that it was not in a position to triumph over the reactionary forces, which were stronger militarily and economically and had experience in political struggle. This is why Yuan Shikai was able to usurp the provisional presidency. This tragedy was unavoidable under those historical conditions. No one, not even Sun Yat-sen, could have prevented it. It is unfair to hold Sun Yat-sen solely responsible.

While relinquishing his post, Sun Yat-sen did not abandon his revolutionary principles but continued to fight for them. During the revolution, Yuan Shikai, who had in his hand the military and political power of the Qing court and the backing of the imperialist powers, attacked the revolutionary army while at the same time making peace overtures to the revolutionaries. The capitulationists, who had sneaked into the ranks of the revolution, clamoured that China would perish if no compromise was made to Yuan. Under the pressure of domestic and foreign counter-revolutionary forces and of the capitulationists, Sun Yat-sen adamantly maintained that before he would turn over the presidency to Yuan, the Qing emperor should step down and



Yuan Shikai should openly declare himself for the republican system. Yuan accepted these conditions. Thus the objective of "overthrowing the monarchy" was accomplished and the Revolution of 1911 achieved a victory of historic significance.

(Excerpts from "Shehui Kexue Zhanxian" [Social Sciences Front] No. 4, 1980.)

## The Aesthetic Value of Golden Section Doctrine

Many famous buildings, both ancient and modern, depict the beauty of nature. The Temple of Heaven in Beijing is intended to emulate the sky, Sydney's opera house is meant to evoke an image of the sea, the Tower of Kuwait is contoured in the shape of the moon, and the Sears Building in Chicago rises up like a mountain. But what people are most familiar with and most like are those creations which emulate mankind itself. The golden section doctrine discovered by the ancient Greek Pythagoras postulates that the rectangle with a ratio between its width and length of 1:1.618 is the most pleasing to the eye. While people have universally acknowledged the truth of this doctrine, no one has been able to come up with a theoretical proof explaining why this is so.

The aesthetic value of the golden section doctrine is that the ratio between the width and length is close to those of the human body. For males the



Temple of Heaven.

average proportion of the human body is 1:1.61 in China. For Chinese females it is also generally applicable. The body forms of various races in the world vary greatly. But there is hardly any difference in the ratio between height and width of the human trunk. This reveals the universal significance of the numerical value of 1.618. In addition, during the evolution of man, there have been no striking changes in this feature of

the human being. People are familiar with the image of the ratio 1:1.618 and find it pleasing to the eye.

When the rectangle ratio between width and length is close to 1:1.618, people get a feeling of balance; if the width is narrowed, the feeling of sturdiness and clumsiness is evolved; greater length gives the feeling of gracefulness and weakness. Such feelings about beauty, sturdiness, clumsiness, gracefulness and weakness are created by the subconscious aesthetic values of people. Since people like the body form of the human being, the main feature of the body form is recreated in the construction of buildings. Many foreign and Chinese palaces, temples, tombs, memorial halls and the layout of some cities, like Changan in China's Tang Dynasty and Dadu (present Beijing) in the Yuan Dynasty, all employ this ratio in their design.

(Excerpts from "Qiankexue" [Latent Science], No. 1, 1981.)

## Composition of China's Land Resources

	unit (100,000 sq. km.)	unit (100 million mu*)	percentage of total area
Total area	96.0	144.0	100.0
Arable land	9.93	14.9	10.4
Land planted to mulberry, tea, fruits and rubber	0.33	0.5	0.3
Natural pasture	28.6	42.9	29.8
Forests	12.2	18.3	12.7
Brushwood	4.51	6.8	4.7
Barren hills and stony soil	8.6	12.9	9.0
Sand dunes and deserts	10.13	15.2	10.6
Glaciers and snow-capped land	0.47	0.7	0.5
Inland water surface	2.67	4.0	2.8
Coastal mudland	0.13	0.2	0.1
Cities, towns and mines	6.67	10.0	6.9
Others	11.74	17.6	12.2

\* One mu is one-fifteenth of a hectare.



## SCIENCE

## Popularization

Popular science journals and newspapers are eagerly started up in every corner of China these days. Their numbers have increased tenfold since 1966, the year the "cultural revolution" started.

At that time there were only 10 such journals in the country and they were available chiefly in the large cities like Beijing and Shanghai. Now there are 110 scientific and technical journals with an aggregate national circulation of 17 million which are available in large, medium and small cities. Forty of these publications have each a circulation of more than 100,000.

*Scientific Farm* has a peasant readership. Its articles on raising ground beetles, earthworms, ricefield eels and bees are particularly popular. Some peasants have made special trips to Shanghai to get more detailed information from the editorial board members. One article which described how boron can be used to fertilize rapeseed helped peasants in Anhui Province increase their output by 58.2 per cent per hectare.

The widespread introduction of television sets, cassette tape recorders, radios, electronic calculators and electronic watches has had increased sales of *Radio*. At present well over one million copies of each issue are sold. A young peasant in Qidong County, Jiangsu Province, reported that he devised an automatic unit for controlling sluice gates after reading *Radio*.

A salesman in Zhejiang Province was able to solve his problems with his wife after reading an article in a popular science magazine, *Science and Life*, which contained information on psychological problems affecting the middle-aged. Other articles in the magazine tell readers how to prepare tea and nutritious food, be good parents and stay healthy in their old age. Its circulation has increased to 1.46 million.

*Children's Science Pictorial* in Beijing has more than 500,000 young readers. However, kindergarten and primary school children are not satisfied; they want more scientific and technical magazines.

The 34 scientific newspapers which are published by national, provincial and municipal organizations have an aggregate circulation of 4.7 million. The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and the Tibet Autonomous Region have scientific papers available in Mongolian, Uygur and Tibetan.

Twenty-nine papers in the country devote space to regular science features while the TV and radio stations broadcast special science programmes for their viewers and listeners.

In August, the China Writers' Association for the Dissemination of Scientific and Technical Knowledge held a forum on how to improve the content of these periodicals and programmes. Experiences were summarized and exchanged and suggestions for new ways of doing the work discussed.

## BEIJING OPERA

## Mei Lanfang Remembered

The 20th anniversary of the death of the famous Chinese stage artist Mei Lanfang was honoured with a four-day Beijing opera festival beginning on August 24. The festival was jointly sponsored by the Ministry of Culture, the Chinese Dramatists' Association and the Beijing Municipal Cultural Bureau.

A dozen female roles created by Mei Lanfang were performed by artists who know his work well.

Participating in the festival were Zhang Junqiu and Du Jinfang, Mei's students; Yu Zhenfei, an 80-year-old opera artist, who was Mei Lanfang's co-performer for many years; Mei Baojiu and Mei Baoyue, the son and daughter of Mei Lanfang; and such well-known actors as Yuan Shihai and Li Wanchun.

Among the operas presented were arias from *The Tyrant Bids His Lady Farewell*, *Drunken Beauty*, *Mu Guiying Takes Command* and "Writing a Plaint," an aria from *Unexpected Encounters*, a popular Mei-school play once performed jointly by Mei Lanfang and Yu Zhenfei. During this festival, these roles were played by Yu Zhenfei and Mei Baojiu.

Born in 1894 in Beijing, Mei Lanfang grew up in a family with a long history of Beijing opera artists. He began studying opera at the age of eight. Three years later he made his debut, playing the part of a *qingyi* (symbolizing a good and virtuous woman) and a woman warrior role. In his long-time





Yu Zhenfei (right) and Mei Baojiu co-starring in the "Unexpected Encounters."

stage career, he reformed the melodies, acting, musical accompaniment and costumes of the female roles, forming his own artistic style which, known as the Mei school, is famous for its clear articulation, pure and mellow voice and sympathetic presentation.

Mei Lanfang was also renowned for his patriotism. During the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45), he refused to perform for the invaders. He grew a moustache and retired from the stage for about eight years. He eked out a living by selling his paintings. In the early years after liberation, he toured the country and performed in factories, villages and mines, giving an average of 100 performances a year.

Mei Lanfang travelled to Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries on cultural exchange missions. His exquisite performances made him world famous. A series of his albums have been published and some of his representative plays have been screened. He himself wrote a book on his stage art.

Mei Lanfang was admitted into the Communist Party in 1959. He was a Member of the Standing Committee of the Chi-

nese People's Political Consultative Conference and a Deputy to the National People's Congress, Vice-Chairman of the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles and Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Dramatists' Association. He died in 1961 in Beijing.

## MUSIC

### Young Musicians

**Violin Competition.** Fifty-two contestants from 22 conservatories and their attached schools came to Beijing in July to participate in China's first national students' violin competition. Each entrant was required to perform pieces by both foreign and Chinese composers. Zhao Feng, chairman of the 16-member panel of judges, said that the selections performed by the youth were quite difficult and these young violinists showed fine technique in their recitals.

In the student division Liu Jian, a 17-year-old Shanghai girl, was triumphant. Her renditions of Prokofiev's *Concerto No. 2*, Ravel's *Tzigane Rhapsody* and *Seaside* by Qin Yongsheng were praised by the panel.

Seven youngsters were awarded in the junior division.

Zhang Le, a 13-year-old school-boy from the Shanghai Conservatory Middle School, won first prize. Among the seven winners only one, Chai Liang, had studied for less than five years. His excellent performance was not only a credit to himself but also to Associate Professor Jin Yanping, his tutor for three years. The youngest victor Wang Xiaodong, performed Mendelssohn's *Concerto in E Minor* with the San Diego Youth Symphony Orchestra last month in Guangzhou.

**Piano Contest.** In June, Shanghai held its first children's piano contest; three first place winners were selected from the 208 contestants. Jiang Chen, a 7-year-old pupil, won first prize in the under-10 category. After only two years of training, he was able to perform Clementi's *Sonatina in C Major, Opus 36, No. 3*, as well as a composition by Xian Xinghai.

Two youthful pianists were jointly awarded first prize in the 10- to 12-year-old category. Ying Tianfeng, whose mother is a music teacher and whose father is an orchestra member, started his playing at four under the careful tutelage of his mother. Xu Zhong began playing at a Shanghai children's palace. The co-winners, both students at the primary school affiliated to the Shanghai Conservatory of Music, played pieces by Beethoven as well as contemporary Chinese composers.

A separate contest was held earlier this year in Gulangyu, an island town in southern China and hometown of Yin Chengzong, a former winner of the Tchaikovsky Prize. Twenty-two contestants ranging in age from 5 to 11 participated. A nine-year-old boy, Su Jingjing, was victorious.



## A New Translation of "Shui Hu Zhuan"

Outlaws of the Marsh (English edition)

《水浒传》

By Shi Naian and Luo Guanzhong,

Translated by Sidney Shapiro,  
Published by Foreign Languages Press (Beijing),

Renminbi: 8 yuan for volume I,  
7.20 for volume II and 8.10  
for volume III.

The English edition of the famous Chinese classic "Shui Hu Zhuan" (*Outlaws of the Marsh*) has just been published in China. Written in the 14th century, it is set in the times of Emperor Hui Zong of the Song Dynasty in the 12th century. The plot concerns the doings of 108 men and women who are forced by a harsh feudal officialdom to take to the Liangshan Marsh, in today's Shandong Province. They band together and resourcefully defeat every attempt of the feudal landlords and local despots to crush them.

Well-organized and smooth-reading, this absorbing novel is clearly the product of highly skilled writers. Its authors, Shi Naian and Luo Guanzhong, lived during the late Yuan (1279-1368) and early Ming (1368-1644)

Dynasties, but little is known about their lives. Their work has been one of the most popular pieces of fiction in China for 600 years. The realistic portrayal and distinct personalities of the leading characters have captured the imagination of Chinese readers and have inspired the creation of other works of literature. Many dramas, films and picture books contain scenes based on parts of the novel.

Different editions of this work have come down through history: a 70-chapter edition (ending with government troops pursuing the rebels), a 100-chapter version (concluding with the rebels being won over and pledging their allegiance to the emperor) and a 120 chapter-version (closing with some capitulators arresting the rebels). This new English edition is primarily a translation of the 70-chapter version, to which the last 30 chapters of the 100-chapter version have been added.

A distinctive feature of the Beijing edition is the beautiful illustrations, which are based on original Ming Dynasty woodcuts. Each of the three volumes has five plates and the cover features a painting by the famous Ming Dynasty artist Chen Laolian (1598-1652). There is also a North American edition of this translation which is being published by Indiana University Press in two volumes.

The translator of *Outlaws of the Marsh* is Sidney Shapiro, a well-known translator of Chinese fictions who works on the magazine *China Pictorial*. Born in New York, he came to China in 1947 and took Chinese citizenship in 1963. His previous translations include Ba Jin's

*The Family* and Mao Dun's collection of short stories, *Spring Silkworms*. He began translating this classic in 1968, taking 10 years to complete this mammoth and difficult translation. His product is faithful to the original and accurately reflects the customs and habits of the Chinese people. After reading this free-flowing rendition of *Outlaws of the Marsh*, readers can gain a better understanding of medieval China. In depicting peasant attempts to resist oppression, this epic represents an excellent source for understanding the social causes of peasant uprisings and the reasons for their inevitable defeat.

— Jian Chuan

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
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
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